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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes important decisions
rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The purpose of the
Review is to indicate cases of first impression, cases that significantly
affect earlier interpretations of North Dakota Law, and other potential
cases of interest.
The following topics are included in the Review:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE-DISABILITY BENEFITS ..
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION-APPRAISAL V. ARBITRATION .
CHOICE OF LAWS-SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS TEST .............
CIVIL RIGHTS-DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION ................
CIVIL RIGHTS-EMPLOYMENT-SEXUAL HARASSMENT .........
CONTRACTS-ACTION FOR RESCISSION AT LAW V. IN EQUITY ....
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-
"No-KNOCK" SEARCH WARRANTS ...................
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES .................
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES .................
FAMILY LAW-ALTERNATING PHYSICAL CUSTODY ............
FAMILY LAW-CHILD SUPPORT-
EMPLOYER-PAID BENEFITS INCLUDED IN INCOME ..........
FAMILY LAW-CUSTODIAL PARENT'S REQUEST TO MOVE
OUT-OF-STATE .................................
FAMILY LAW-DIVORCE-CHILD CUSTODY ................
FAMILY LAW-DIVORCE-CHILD SUPPORT .................
FAMILY LAW-DIVORCE--CHILD SUPPORT .................
FAMILY LAW-PARENT AND CHILD-VISITATION ............
FAMILY LAW-POST-MINORITY CHILD SUPPORT .............
FAMILY LAW-PROPERTY DIVISION ......................
FAMILY LAW-TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ...........
TORTS-LIABILITY OF PASSENGERS IN VEHICLE
DRIVEN BY INTOXICATED PERSON ....................






















ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE-DISABILITY BENEFITS
SAAKIAN V. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS COMPENSATION BUREAU
In Saakian,1 a worker filed a claim for workers compensation
benefits. 2 The Workers Compensation Bureau awarded medical expense
benefits but not disability benefits, and the supreme court upheld the
award. 3
In July 1996, Valeriy Saakian was diagnosed with bilateral tendon-
itis or "tennis elbow." 4 After taking a week off from his work as a car
washer, as recommended by his physician, Saakian applied for workers
compensation benefits. 5 Saakian's physician later indicated that the
injury likely was work-related but that Saakian did not have to be placed
on any work restrictions. 6
In November 1996, the Bureau dismissed Saakian's claim. 7
Saakian then requested an administrative hearing, and the Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) recommended reversal of the Bureau's dismissal.8 The
ALJ found that Saakian had proven a compensable injury because his
doctor had linked his injury to his work.9 The Bureau accepted the
ALJ's recommendation to award medical expenses to Saakian.10 How-
ever, stressing that no doctor had advised Saakian that he could not
continue working, 'the Bureau amended the ALJ's decision by declining
to award disability benefits. 1
On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, 12 Saakian asserted
four major arguments. First, he contended that he had inadequate notice
that his entitlement to disability benefits would be in issue. 13 In support,
Saakian pointed out that the only issue listed by the ALJ in the specifica-
tion of issues was "whether claimant sustained a compensable injury."14
The court recognized that section 28-32-05(3)(c) of the North Dakota
Century Code required a written specification of issues before an admin-
1. 1998 N.D. 227, 587 N.W.2d 166.
2. Saakian v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 1998 N.D. 227, 4, 587 N.W.2d
166, 169.
3. Id. 1, 587 N.W.2d at 168.
4. Id. 13.
5. Id. 4, 587 N.W.2d at 169.
6. Id. 5. Saakian's physician noted that his injury could have resulted from both playing his
accordion and performing his work duties. Id.
7. Id. 6. The Bureau concluded that Saakian had not shown a compensable injury. Id.
8. Id.




12. Prior to this appeal, Saakian unsuccessfully appealed to the district court. Id.
13. Id. 10, 587 N.W.2d at 170. Saakian's argument implicated due process principles. Id. I 11.
14. Id. 10.
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istrative hearing on a workers compensation claim.15 The court further
explained that due process requires that a person challenging an agency
action be adequately informed in advance of the issues to be addressed
so the person can be ready to present arguments and evidence on those
issues.16 Applying the law, the court stressed that Saakian had provided
disability claim information on his original claim form submitted to the
Bureau; the Bureau had designated, in its caption, Saakian's claim as a
"time loss claim"; and, during the hearing, both parties presented testi-
mony and evidence regarding Saakian's disability benefits.1 7 The court
accordingly concluded that "[e]ven though the specification of issues
could have been more precise, Saakian was not, under these circum-
stances, unfairly surprised."18
Second, Saakian argued that administrative res judicata precluded
the Bureau from amending the AL's decision.19  Saakian apparently
claimed that the initial order denying benefits or the AL's recommend-
ed order was res judicata and prohibited the Bureau from amending the
ALJ's recommended order. 20 However, the court stressed that the
doctrine of res judicata only prohibited relitigation of a claim or issue
resolved by a final decision.21 Since the initial dismissal was subject to
Saakian's right to request a hearing and since the AL's findings and
conclusions were merely recommendations to the Bureau, neither was a
final decision, and so res judicata did not apply.22
Third, Saakian contended that the participation of the Bureau's
director of claims and rehabilitation in the appeal denied him due
process and violated North Dakota Century Code section 28-32-12.2(1)
which forbids a person who has "served as investigator, prosecutor, or
advocate in the investigatory or prehearing stage" from serving as a
15. The statute provides:
A hearing under this subsection may not be held unless the parties have been properly
served with a copy of the notice of hearing as well as a written specification of issues for
hearing or other document indicating the issues to be considered and determined at the
hearing. In lieu of, or in addition to, a specification of issues or other document, an ex-
planation about the nature of the hearing and the issues to be considered and determined
at the hearing may be contained in the notice.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-05(3)(c) (Supp. 1997).
16. Saakian, 11, 587 N.W.2d at 170 (citing Estate of Robertson v. Cass County, 492 N.W.2d
599, 602 (N.D. 1992)).
17. Id. 13
18. Id. "Saakian was not prejudiced by the specification of issues for this administrative
hearing." Id., 587 N.W.2d at 170-71.
19. Id. 16, 587 N.W.2d at 171.
20. Id.
21. Id. 17.
22. Id. The court noted that section 28-32-13(3) of the North Dakota Century Code gave the
Bureau authority to amend or reject the AL's recommended findings and conclusions. Id.
1999) 657
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hearing officer.23 The court quickly disposed of Saakian's argument by
pointing out that the Bureau's director did not serve as the hearing
officer because the Bureau successfully requested appointment of an
ALJ or hearing officer to preside at the hearing and issue a recom-
mendation. 24 The court further noted that the director was authorized
both to issue the initial decision and to accept or amend the AL's
recommendation .25
Finally, Saakian argued that, contrary to the Bureau's finding, the
evidence did establish he was disabled.26 In analyzing Saakian's claim,
the court reviewed the definition of "disability" under the North Dakota
workers compensation statute. 27 The court accordingly noted that "dis-
ability" could be permanent total, temporary total, or partial. 28 The
court further recognized that to establish a partial disability, "there
should be a physical disability, the employee should be able to work
subject to the disability, and there should be an actual loss of earning
capacity." 2 9 Stressing that Saakian's physician reported Saakian could
perform his job without restrictions and that no physician told Saakian
he could not perform his work duties, the court concluded that the
Bureau's finding of no disability was reasonable.30
ALTERNATIVE DIsPuTE RESOLUTION-APPRAISAL V. ARBITRATION
MINOT TOWN & COUNTRY V. FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE Co.
In Minot Town & Country v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 3 1 the
court concluded that an appraisal, not arbitration, had occurred and thus
affirmed denial of the appellant-insured's motion for judgment vacating
an arbitration award. 32
23. Id. 1 19, 587 N.W.2d at 172. Saakian specifically alleged that the director functioned as a
hearing officer when he issued the final order, and thus the use of the director "at both ends of the
administrative proceedings denied him a fair hearing process." Id. 18, 587 N.W.2d at 171-72.
24. Id. 1 19, 587 N.W.2d at 172.
25. Id. 120.
26. Id. 122.
27. Id. 23. The court first noted that the statute defines "disability" as "loss of earnings capaci-
ty and may be permanent total, temporary total, or partial." Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-01-02(13) (1995)).
28. Id. The court further explained that an employee who is medically able to go back to work is
not totally disabled. Id. (citing Claim of Olson, 419 N.W.2d 894, 897 (N.D. 1988))
29. Id. (citing Risch v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau. 447 N.W.2d 308, 309 (N.D.
1989)).
30. Id. I 24-26, 587 N.W.2d at 172-73. The court concluded that any loss of earning capacity
incurred by Saakian was not caused by his work injury. Id. 25, 587 N.W.2d at 173.
31. 1998 N.D. 215, 587 N.W.2d 189.
32. Minot Town & Country v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 1998 N.D. 215, 1 14, 587 N.W.2d
189, 191.
[VOL. 75:655658
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After a hailstorm caused damage to its property, appellant-insured,
Minot Town & Country (hereinafter Town & Country), filed a claim
with the appellee-insurer, Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. (hereinafter
Fireman's Fund). 33 A disagreement arose during the parties' attempt to
resolve the claim, and the parties exercised an appraisal option for which
the insurance contract provided. 34 Pursuant to the option, each party
chose an appraiser, and the appraisers then chose an umpire. 35 Assert-
ing impartiality concerns, Town & Country objected to the appraiser
chosen by Fireman's Fund. 36 Fireman's Fund countered by stressing
that its appraiser stated he could be impartial and disinterested. 37 Town
& Country then reiterated its objection but concluded that since the
appraiser thought he could be impartial, there was no reason to argue the
issue prior to the proceeding. 38 The appraisers subsequently made an
award; Town & Country then moved the district court for judgment
vacating the award. 39 Town & Country contended that the appraisal
method was an arbitration subject to the North Dakota Arbitration Act.4 0
The district court denied the motion and Town & Country appealed.4 1
In deciding whether the appraisal method was subject to the North
Dakota Arbitration Act, the court began by differentiating between "ap-
praisal" and "arbitration." 42 The court explained that while "arbitra-
tion is a quasi-judicial proceeding that ordinarily will decide the entire
controversy," "appraisal establishes only the amount of a loss and not
liability." 43
The court then examined the particular language of the appraisal
option. 44 The court noted that the option provided that if the parties
"disagree on the value of the property or the amount of loss, either may
make written demand for an appraisal of the loss." The court also
acknowledged that the option provided "[i]f there is an appraisal,
33. Id. 2, 587 N.W.2d at 190.
34. Id.
35. Id. 13.








42. Id. 8 (citing Erickson v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.W.2d 579, 581 (N.D. 1981)).
43. Id. (citing Hartford Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Teachworth, 898 F.2d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir. 1990);
Elberon Bathing v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 389 A.2d 439, 446 (N.J. 1978); Kawa v. Nationwide Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 664 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997); and 14 GEORGE J. CoucH E-r AL., COUcui ON
INSURANCE 2d § 50:3, at 163-64 (Rev. ed. 1982)).
44. Id. 9.
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[Fireman's Fund] will still retain [its] right to deny the claim." 45 In
light of such language, the court determined that the option merely dealt
with the amount of the loss and left open the issue of liability.46 Conse-
quently, the contract provided for a mere appraisal, and not arbitration,
making the North Dakota Arbitration Act inapplicable. 47 The court
therefore affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for judgment
vacating an arbitration award. 48
CHOICE OF LAWS-SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS TEST
DALEY v. AMERICAN STATES PREFERRED INSURANCE Co.
In Daley,49 the court clarified that the significant contacts test still
governed choice of laws issues. 50 Applying the test, the court found that
North Dakota had more significant contacts in this case than Minne-
sota. 51 Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision to
apply Minnesota law.52
On May 11, 1996, Ryan Daley and Nathan Schaffer, North Dakota
residents, were involved in a one-vehicle accident in Minnesota. 53 Daley,
the injured passenger, was covered by two no-fault insurance policies. 54
An American States Preferred Insurance Company (hereinafter Ameri-
can) policy issued to Daley's mother provided basic personal injury
protection.55 A Nodak Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter Nodak)
policy issued to Schaffer covering the vehicle also provided basic per-
sonal injury protection coverage to Daley. 56 Before litigation began,
Daley received $5,000 in benefits from Nodak.57
On June 24, 1997, Daley sued both insurance companies in North
Dakota district court, alleging he was entitled to benefits for his unpaid
medical bills.58 The companies disputed whether Minnesota or North
45. Id. 1 9, 587 N.W.2d at 190-91.
46. Id. 1 10 (citing Kawa, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 432). The court also noted the clarity with which the
insurance policy provided for appraisal. Id. I 11 (citing Brassard v. Western Capital Corp., 763 F.
Supp. 1017, 1019 (D. Minn. 1990)).
47. Id. 12.
48. Id. 14.
49. 1998 N.D. 225, 587 N.W.2d 159.
50. Daley v. American States Preferred Ins. Co., 1998 N.D. 225, 138, 587 N.W.2d 159, 166.
51. Id.





57. Id. 1 3. After paying $5,000 in medical expenses, Nodak desired to coordinate benefits with
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Dakota law applied and which company had to pay the medical bills.59
Thus, both companies moved for summary judgment. 60 Applying
Minnesota law, the district court concluded that American was first
obligated to pay benefits and granted Nodak's motion for summary
judgment. 61 American appealed. 62
On review, the supreme court first identified the conflict in the laws
of Minnesota and North Dakota.63 The court noted that while no-fault
insurance coverage followed the person under Minnesota law, no-fault
insurance coverage followed the vehicle under North Dakota law. 64 The
court thus explained that under Minnesota law, American would be
required to pay the no-fault benefits, but that under North Dakota law,
Nodak would be required to pay the no-fault benefits.65
The court then clarified its adherence to the "significant contacts"
approach. 66 The court explained that application of that approach
would require using the law of the state which "because of its relation-
ship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest con-
cern with the specific issue raised in the litigation." 67 Further, the court
noted that it had altered the original significant contacts approach by
adopting five "choice influencing factors"; 1) predictability of results;
2) maintenance of interstate and international order; 3) simplification of
the judicial task; 4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests;
and 5) application of the better rule of law.68 Accordingly, the signifi-
cant contacts approach became a two-pronged test.69 First, all of the
relevant contacts which might logically influence the decision of which
law to apply are determined. 70 Second, the five choice-influencing
factors are applied to determine which state has the most significant
interest.71
59. Id. "Neither company denied Daley was entitled to coverage under their policies." Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. 1 4 (noting that the district court had applied MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.47(4)). The court




64. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.47(4)(a) and N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-41-13(2)(a)).
65. Id.
66. Id. 6, 587 N.W.2d at 160-61. The court specifically desired to correct the erroneous
assumption that its previous case law "signaled a break from this Court's traditional 'significant
contacts' approach to choice of law analysis." Id., 587 N.W.2d at 161.
67. Id. 0 (quoting Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963)).
68. Id. 11, 587 N.W.2d at 162 (citing Issendorf v. Olson, 194 N.W.2d 750, 754-55 (N.D.
1972)). The court explained that the choice-influencing factors it adopted in Issendorf were guidelines
suggested by Dean Leflar. Id.
69. Id. 112.
70. Id. (citing Issendorf 194 N.W.2d at 755).
71. Id. (citing Issendorf 194 N.W.2d at 754-55).
1999]
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Similarly, the court indicated that its use of the Restatement ap-
proach in a previous case did not signify a change in choice of law
analysis. 72 Noting that the Restatement factors were very similar to the
choice-influencing factors, the court explained that its prior use of the
Restatement was merely an attempt to define the choice-influencing
factors more clearly. 73
Applying the first prong of the significant contacts approach, the
court reviewed which contacts might logically influence its decision. 74
The court acknowledged that the injured passenger and the driver were
North Dakota residents, that the American general liability insurance
policy was issued to Daley in North Dakota, that the Nodak automobile
insurance policy was issued to Schaffer in North Dakota, and that all of
Daley's medical expenses were incurred in North Dakota. 75 The court
also noted that the only contact with Minnesota was the place of the
accident. 76
Turning to the second prong, the court considered the predictability
of results.77 The court first explained that the predictability factor
involved fulfilling the parties' justified expectations.78 While recogniz-
ing that the place an insurance contract is made was not dispositive, the
court stressed that the driver and passenger were North Dakota residents
and that the two insurance policies were negotiated, issued, and paid for
in North Dakota.79 Consequently, the court held that the predictability
factor favored application of North Dakota law.80
The court next considered the second factor, the maintenance of
interstate and international order.8  The court indicated that this factor
72. Id. 1 17, 587 N.W.2d at 163. The court noted that during its consideration of the five choice-
influencing factors in Apollo Sprinkler Co. v. Fire Sprinkler Suppliers & Design, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 386
(N.D. 1989), it referenced the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws approach to choice of laws.
Id. 13, 587 N.W.2d at 162. The court further noted that the Second Restatement approach involved
identifying specific contacts and then measuring those contacts by reference to the following seven
principles: the needs of the interstate and international systems; the relevant policies of the forum; the
relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interest of those states in the determination
of the particular issue; the protection of the justified expectations; the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law; certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and ease in the determination
and application of the law to be applied. Id. 14 n.4 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFUCT CF
LAWS § 6(2)(a)-(g) (1971)).
73. Id. 17, 587 N.W.2d at 163.





79. Id. U 24-25. "The state whose law is chosen must have a substantial connection with rele-
vant aspects of the insurance transaction." Id. 25 (quoting Robert A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS
LAW § 103, at 290).
80. Id. 26.
81. Id. 27, 587 N.W.2d at 164-65.
662 [VOL. 75:655
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involved determining "whether the application of North Dakota law
would manifest disrespect for Minnesota's sovereignty." 8 2 Stressing
that the significant contacts were clearly with North Dakota, the court
found that application of North Dakota law would not cause interstate
friction. 83
Deeming the third factor irrelevant,8 4 the court turned to the fourth
factor, advancement of the forum's governmental interests. 85 The court
determined that North Dakota had a substantial governmental interest in
"regulating the relationship between two North Dakota insurance com-
panies and a North Dakota insured." 86 Moreover, the court considered
the "fortuitous location of the accident" insufficient to create a
substantial governmental interest in Minnesota.87
Finally, the court reached the fifth factor, application of the better
rule of law. 8 8 The court characterized this as involving a determination
of which rule made "good socio-economic sense for the time when the
court speaks."89 The court initially conceded that at first glance Minne-
sota's no-fault law appeared to make better socio-economic sense;90
Minnesota's law provided for $40,000 of no-fault benefits, while North
Dakota's provided for only $30,000.91 The court similarly recognized
that while North Dakota law provided a no-fault insurer the right to
coordinate benefits with the insured's health carrier, Minnesota law did
not.92 However, the court pointed out that the insured was covered by an
ERISA plan which foreclosed coordination of benefits; further, the
insured's claim was for less than $13,000 and thus did not exhaust the
$30,000 limit under North Dakota law. 93 The court consequently
82. Id. The court acknowledged that an aspect of the sovereignty concern involved "maintain-
[ing] a coherent legal system where the courts of different states strive to sustain, rather than subvert,
each other's interests in areas where their own interests are less strong." Id., 587 N.W.2d at 165
(citing Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267,
285-87 (1966)).
83. Id. 1 29. The court added that "maintenance of interstate order d[id] not require application
of Minnesota law." Id.
84. The court reasoned that simplification of the judicial task was not a factor because both
states' no fault laws could be applied without difficulty. Id. 30.
85. Id. 31.
86. Id. 1 33. The court also expressed concern for applying Minnesota law. Id. For instance,




89. Id. (citing Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice Influencing Considerations, 54
CAL. L. REV. 1584, 1588 (1966)).
90. Id. 36, 587 N.W.2d at 166.
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determined that the better rule of law factor did not affect the significant
contacts analysis.
Concluding that most of the factors weighed in favor of applying
North Dakota law and that none of the factors weighed in favor of apply-
ing Minnesota law, the court held that North Dakota had the more
significant contacts. 94 The court therefore reversed the trial court's deci-
sion and held that Nodak was obligated to pay Daley's no-fault benefits.
CIvIL RIGHTS-DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
ZIMMERMAN V. MINOT PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 1
In Zimmerman,95 the court heard a case involving the dismissal of a
disability discrimination claim. 96 Concluding that the trial court did not
clearly err in finding that the defendant had showed its employment
decision to be based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, the court
affirmed the dismissal. 97
The plaintiff-appellant, David Zimmerman, suffered from a severe
hearing deficiency. 98 In 1989, he earned a degree in middle school
education. 99 After becoming certified, Zimmerman began instructing
physical education classes at the North Dakota School for the Deaf. 100
In addition, he repeatedly applied for a position with the defendant-
appellee, Minot Public School District No. 1 (hereinafter District). 101
In 1994, the District advertised a "six-tenths" physical education
position, which included coaching duties, at a middle school.1 02 The
middle school's principal knew Zimmerman and informed him of the
opening.103 Eventually, Zimmerman was one of three finalists for the
position.1 04
However, the District ultimately chose a different candidate. 105 Un-
like Zimmerman, the other candidate had a physical education degree
and had expressed interest in the specific coaching duties. 106 The other
candidate also had a 3.70 grade point average while Zimmerman had a
94. Id. 138.
95. 1998 N.D. 14, 574 N.W.2d 797.
96. Zimmerman v. Minot Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 1998 N.D. 14,574 N.W.2d 797.
97. Id. 1, 574 N.W.2d at 798.
98. Id. 2.




103. Id. V 2, 4. Zimmerman had worked with the principal during Zimmerman's semester of
student teaching. Id. 1 2.
104. Id. 5.
105. Id. 6.
106. Id. 9 5-6.
664 (VOL. 75:655
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2.50 grade point average. 107 Finally, the candidate had recently com-
pleted student teaching at the middle school with the opening and had
received excellent recommendations from his supervising teachers.
108
During a later phone conversation, the principal told Zimmerman
that he was a good and qualified candidate, but "experience in our
building" was the major factor in the hiring decision.109
Zimmerman subsequently sued the District, alleging its failure to
hire him was a violation of the North Dakota Human Rights Act.110 The
trial court found that Zimmerman had not established a "prima facie
showing that the reason he was not hired ... was based upon a discrimi-
natory decision by the District."lll The trial court accordingly dis-
missed the action and Zimmerman appealed.112
On appeal, the court began by explaining the proper framework for
analyzing discrimination claims under the North Dakota Human Rights
Act. 113 It indicated that the plaintiff first must show a prima facie case of
discrimination. 114 If the plaintiff meets that initial burden, then the
defendant must rebut the presumption of discrimination by proving that
its action was motivated by legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.
115
The court then recognized that the parties disputed what constituted
a prima facie case. 116 The court pointed out that the parties agreed that
the plaintiff must show that he was handicapped and qualified and that
he was not hired.117 However, the District contended that a fourth
element, evidence of unfair treatment creating at least an inference of
discrimination, was also required.11 8
While observing that the district court had implicitly agreed with the
District on the existence of a fourth element, the court found it unneces-
sary to analyze the elements of the prima facie case because the district
court had found that the District had shown that its decision was com-
pelled by legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. 119 The court explained
107. Id. 16.
108. Id.
109. Id. 1 7, 574 N.W.2d at 798-99.
110. Id. 8, 574 N.W.2d at 799.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. I 10 (citing Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 225, 229 (N.D. 1993)).
114. Id. (citing Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 229).
115. Id. (citing Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 229).
116. Id. 13.
117. Id.
118. Id. 1 14, 574 N.W.2d at 800.
119. Id. In 14-15. The trial court had explained that "the mere fact that one is physically handi-
capped, qualified for a position, but is not hired, does not, in and of itself, constitute a showing that the
reason was based upon discrimination because of the person's handicap." Id. 1 14.
6651999]
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that its examination would thus involve only whether the district court's
finding was clearly erroneous. 120
The court then considered the evidence that the District had present-
ed in support of its contention that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
compelled its decision.121 The District had shown that 24 of its 30
physical education teachers had physical education majors and that it
employs several physically handicapped persons.122 The District had
also pointed out the chosen candidate's higher GPA and interest in the
coaching duties.1 23 In addition, the District itself, through the principal,
had informed Zimmerman of the position and had considered him a
good candidate. 124 Upon this evidence, the court reasoned that a strong
inference that the District has no discriminatory motives was per-
mitted. 125 Consequently, the court upheld the trial court's finding that
the District had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that its
decision was motivated by legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. 126
CiviL RIGHTS-EMPLOYMENT-SEXUAL HARASSMENT
OPP V. SOURCE ONE MANAGEMENT, INC.
In Opp v. Source One Management, Inc. ,127 a male former employ-
ee sued his former employer for sexual harassment and retaliatory
discharge under the North Dakota Human Rights Act. 128 The supreme
court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
employer. 129
Kelly Opp worked for Source One for nearly three years; during
that time, his supervisor was Jule Holzer. 130 Opp alleged that "a number
of cards, notes, e-mails, and social invitations" he received from Holzer
during his employment contained sexual innuendo and implications that
120. Id. 15 (citing Thompson v. City of Watford City, 1997 N.D. 172, 12, 568 N.W.2d 736).
121. Id. 16.
122. Id.
123. Id. ' 17.
124. Id.
125. Id. The court also noted Zimmerman's argument which focused on his phone conversation
with the principal. Id. 19. Zimmerman specifically argued that the principal's failure to mention
reasons other than "experience in our building" proved that the District had discriminated. Id. How-
ever, the court pointed out that the principal had difficulty using the phone system used during the
conversation and that confidentiality concerns justified the principal's view that subjects such as
Zimmerman's academic and experience deficiencies were inappropriate for a conversation via the
District's phone system. Id. Moreover, the court noted that the trial court had found the principal to
be truthful. Id.
126. Id. 4120.
127. 1999 N.D. 52, 591 N.W.2d 101.
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she wanted a sexual relationship with him. 131 Opp also complained of
flirtatious behavior on Holzer's part, including brief physical contact. 132
Source One also had complaints about Opp during this time, issuing him
several written warnings regarding his behavior in the workplace and his
use of government vehicles for personal use.133 Opp was fired on July 3,
1995, for again using a government vehicle for his personal use. 134
The supreme court began by noting that it had yet to address a
sexual harassment claim under the North Dakota Human Rights Act, but
it would look to federal interpretations of Title VII, a similar statute, for
guidance.135 Noting that it is well established that sexual harassment is a
form of sex discrimination under Title VII, the court concluded that
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under the North
Dakota Human Rights Act as well. 136 Under either act, the plaintiff must
bear the burden of establishing a prima facie case. 137 To do so, the
plaintiff must prove five elements: 1) the employee belongs to a protect-
ed class; 2) the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment;
3) the sexual harassment was based on sex; 4) the harassment affected a
term, condition, or privilege of employment; and 5) the employer knew
or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper
remedial action.13 8 If the plaintiff fails to prove any element by a
preponderance of the evidence, summary judgment for the defendant is
required.139
The court noted that, although summary judgment is seldom
appropriate in the employment discrimination context, "where factual
inferences are often the basis of the claim," summary judgment be-
comes appropriate "when reasonable minds can draw but one conclu-
sion from the evidence." 140 With this introduction, the court held, "as a
matter of law, reasonable persons could only conclude the evidence Opp
presents does not rise to the level of actionable sexual harassment under
the North Dakota Human Rights Act." 141
As a deficiency in any one of the five elements required for a prima
facie case is sufficient to mandate summary judgment, the court
131. Id. 5, 591 N.W.2d at 104.
132. Id. It 6-8.
133. Id. 9, 591 N.W.2d at 104-05.
134. Id.
135. Id. 12, 591 N.W.2d at 105.




140. Id. 16, 591 N.W.2d at 106-07.
141. Id.
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examined only the fourth element. 142 Finding none of the conduct Opp
complained of sufficiently severe to "alter the conditions of [his]
employment," the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment. 143
CONTRACT LAW-ACTION FOR RESCISSION AT LAW V. IN EQUITY
BARKER V. NESS
In Barker, 144 the court concluded that the plaintiff's action was one
in equity and that therefore she was not entitled to a jury trial. 145 The
court also determined that restoration of the status quo required the
plaintiff to pay rental income collected to the defendants and the defen-
dants to pay interest on the purchase price paid by the plaintiff.14 6
On July 14, 1993, Jan Ness and Cynthia Smith, the defendants, sold
a home to the plaintiff, Karen Barker.147 The plaintiff paid $40,000.148
After discovering a water problem in the basement, Barker filed a
complaint in district court, alleging that the defendants had fraudulently
misrepresented the home's condition. 149 The district court determined
that the sale should be rescinded. 150 The district court accordingly
ordered 1) the plaintiff, pursuant to section 9-09-04(2) of the North
Dakota Century Code, to restore everything of value received during the
ownership of the property to the defendants, 2) the plaintiff return the
property to the defendants, and 3) the defendants to pay $33,830.87 to
the plaintiff. The district court calculated the defendants' payment by
subtracting the rental income received by the plaintiff from the plain-
tiff's total cost of the home.151 The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the
district erred in denying her a jury trial and in reducing her restitution
by the rental income she had received.152
The court first addressed the plaintiff's argument that she was
denied her right to a jury trial.15 3 The court explained that whether a
142. Id. 1 17, 591 N.W.2d at 107. The district court examined all five elements and concluded
that Opp failed to establish three of them. Id.
143. Id. 27, 591 N.W.2d at 109.
144. 1998 N.D. 223, 587 N.W.2d 183.
145. Barker v. Ness, 1998 N.D. 223, 1 21, 587 N.W.2d 183, 188.
146. Id. in 26-27, 587 N.W.2d at 188-89.
147. Id. 1 3, 587 N.W.2d at 185.
148. Id.
149. Id. Upon their initial purchase of the home, the defendants had received a contract for
deed which mentioned a water problem in the home's basement. Id. 2.
150. Id. 14.
151. Id. The plaintiff's total costs were $44,855.87, and the amount of rental income she
received was $11,025. Id.
152. Id. 15.
153. Id. [ 6.
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party is entitled to a jury trial depends on whether the case involves an
action at law or a claim in equity. 15 4 A party is not entitled to a jury trial
if the action involves a claim in equity.155
The court then noted the options available to a party who has been
fraudulently induced to enter a contract. 156 Generally, a party could
either affirm the contract and sue for damages or rescind the contract
and restore everything of value received under the contract. 157 The
court further noted that a party who elects to rescind a contract must
choose between two possible legal theories.158 First, pursuant to section
9-09-04 of the North Dakota Century Code, the party may choose to
bring an action at law based upon an election to rescind and offer to
restore. 159 The court recognized that the action at law required the plain-
tiff to give notice to the defendant and to make an offer to restore. 160
Still describing the action at law, the court noted that "[b]ecause the
plaintiff has restored the defendant to a pre-contractual position, the
action is based on rescission, it is not one for rescission." 16 1
Alternatively, the court noted that a party, pursuant to section
32-04-21 of the North Dakota Century Code, may choose to bring a
claim in equity seeking cancellation of the contract. 162 The court noted
that a party bringing a claim in equity, unlike a party bringing an action
at law, does not have to make an offer of restoration. 163 Further, the
court reasoned, "in equity the suit is not on rescission, but for rescission,
it is not a suit based upon the rescission already accomplished by the
plaintiff but a suit to have the court decree a rescission." 164
The court then turned to the facts of the instant case. 165 The court
first noted that the plaintiffs complaint sought cancellation of the sale
and return of the home to the defendants.1 66 In addition, the court
stressed there was no evidence showing that the plaintiff gave notice of
154. Id. (citing Farm Credit Bank of St Paul v. Rub, 481 N.w.2d 451, 458 (N.D. 1992)).
155. Id. (citing Rub, 481 N.W.2d at 458).
156. Id. 18, 587 N.W.2d at 185-86.
157. Id. (citing DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 9.4, at 712 (2d ed. 1993)).
158. Id. 1 10 (citing Schaff v. Kennelly, 61 N.W.2d 538, 546 (N.D. 1953), overruled on other
grounds by Hatch v. Hatch, 484 N.W.2d 283 (N.D. 1992)).
159. Id. (citing Omlid v. Sweeney, 484 N.W.2d 486, 489-90 (N.D. 1992)). The court also cited
other jurisdictions' treatment of statutes similar to the North Dakota statutes to verify that section 9-09
was an action at law. Id. i 17-18, 587 N.W.2d at 187.
160. Id. 12, 587 N.W.2d at 186 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE 9-09-04 and Schaff, 61 N.W.2d at
546).
161. Id. 1 13 (citing DOBBS, supra note 157, at 712).
162. Id. 10 (citing Omlid, 484 N.W.2d at 489-90).
163. Id. 15, 587 N.W.2d at 186-87 (citing Kracl v. Loseke, 461 N.W.2d 67, 73 (Neb. 1990)).
164. Id., 587 N.W.2d at 187 (citing DOBBS, supra note 157, at 463).
165. Id. 21,587 N.W.2d at 188.
166. Id.
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rescission or made an offer to restore. 167 The court accordingly con-
cluded that the plaintiff proceeded in equity and was not entitled to a
jury trial.168 Consequently, the court held that the trial court did not err
in denying the plaintiffs request for a jury trial. 169
The court next considered the plaintiffs argument that the district
court erred in reducing her recovery by the amount of rental income she
had received.170 Recognizing that "restoration of the status quo" was
central to any action for rescission, the court explained that both parties
must be returned to their pre-contractual positions.171 The court noted
that other jurisdictions require the buyers to remit the fair rental value
and sellers to remit the interest on the amount paid. 172 Accordingly, the
court held that the plaintiff must remit the reasonable use value gained
from the contract and that the defendants must remit the value of the use
of the money paid to them. 173 The court thus remanded the case for a
redetermination of the amount of restitution. 174
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-
"No-KNOCK" SEARCH WARRANTS
STATE V. JOHNSON
In State v. Johnson,175 the court reviewed a judge's issuance of a
no-knock search warrant. 176 Stressing that law enforcement officers had
informed the judge of the defendant's drug activities and of the defen-
dant's associates' dangerous propensities, the court affirmed the denial
of the motion to suppress evidence. 177
On April 9, 1997, a deputy sheriff applied for various search war-
rants. 178 The supporting affidavit detailed a large drug conspiracy,
stated that the defendant possessed guns, and stated that some of the
defendant's associates were dangerous and also possessed guns.179 The
167. Id
168. Id. (citing Farm Credit Bank of St Paul v. Rub, 481 N.W.2d 451, 458 (N.D. 1992)).
169. Id.
170. Id. 122.
171. Id. 23. The court reasoned that it was proper to consider the equitable principles under-
lying section 9-09-04 of the North Dakota Century Code when computing the amount of restitution
under section 32-04-23. Id. 1 24.
172. Id. 26 (citing Brink v. Larson, 411 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)).
173. Id. 27, 587 N.W.2d at 189. The court indicated that the trial court should use market
interest rates to determine the amount that the defendants must remit for the value of the use of the
money paid to them. Id.
174. Id. 128.
175. 1999 N.D. 33, 590 N.W.2d 192.
176. State v. Johnson, 1999 N.D. 33, 1-5, 590 N.W.2d 192, 194.
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district court issued "no-knock" warrants, and police found incriminat-
ing drug evidence during the subsequent search of the defendant's
home. 180
In district court, the defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the
evidence and was convicted. 181 The defendant then appealed the district
court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. 182
On appeal, the court first noted the standard of review.18 3 The
district court's denial would not be reversed if, after resolving conflicts
in testimony in favor of affirmance, "there was sufficient competent
evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's findings and the
decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." 184
The court then turned to the defendant's first argument. The
defendant asserted that the warrants were issued "per se" and that the
judge improperly reasoned that drug violators are usually apt to destroy
disposable evidence and often are armed and dangerous.' 8 5 The court
acknowledged that "per se" issuances of no-knock search warrants were
unconstitutional. 186 Rather, the court explained, that no-knock search
warrants must be reasonable and may be appropriate where interests such
as officer's safety and integrity of evidence could be jeopardized.1 87
Further, the court acknowledged that a North Dakota statute provided
that no-knock search warrants are only appropriate where the applicant
shows probable cause to believe that the announcement of officers'
presence would jeopardize officer safety or the integrity of evidence. 188
The court then turned to the information presented to the issuing
judge. 189 Pursuant to officers' personal knowledge and the information
of reliable informants, the affidavit provided that the defendant carried a





184. Id. (citing State v. Erbele, 554 N.W.2d 448, 450 (N.D. 1996)).
185. Id. 8.
186. Id. 9, 590 N.W.2d at 195 (citing Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1420 (1997)).
While noting that the Fourth Amendment and the North Dakota Constitution require all searches to be
reasonable and that officers' knocking and announcing their presence prior to a search was an im-
portant factor in determining reasonableness, the court recognized that the "rule of reasonableness is
flexible." Id. 1 8, 590 N.W.2d at 194-95. Further, the court noted that Richards imposed a duty on the
court to determine whether the facts of a particular entry justified a no-knock search. Id. 9, 590
N.W.2d at 195.
187. Id. 8 (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934-36 (1995); State v. Knudson, 499
N.W.2d 872, 876 (N.D. 1993)).
188. Id. I II (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-32). In contrast, the Fourth Amendment merely
requires officers to have a reasonable suspicion that announcement of their presence would
jeopardize their safety or the integrity of evidence. Id. 1 10.
189. Id. 12.
190. Id., 590 N.W.2d at 195-96.
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The affidavit also noted that a garbage can search at the defendant's
home revealed a "guns for sale" advertisement. 191 On this information
and similar information, the court found that the magistrate properly
concluded that there was probable cause to believe announcement of the
officers presence to conduct a search would jeopardize such officers'
safety.192 Consequently, the court upheld the issuance of the no-knock
search warrant. 193
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
STATE V. HERRICK
In State v. Herrick,194 the court revisited the conviction of Curtis
Herrick after the trial court reinstated his convictions on remand. 195
When it heard the case earlier, 196 the court had determined that a
no-knock warrant, issued on a per se basis due to the alleged presence of
drugs, was unconstitutional, and it remanded the case for determination
of whether a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should
apply.197 On remand, the trial court applied the good-faith exception
described by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Leon, 198 and the supreme court affirmed.199
Curtis Herrick was arrested after a search of his home revealed the
presence of marijuana and equipment used for indoor horticulture. 200 A
judge issued a no-knock search warrant based on information obtained
from searches of Herrick's garbage. 201 In his motion to suppress the
191. Id.
192. Id. 1 13, 590 N.W.2d at 196. The court described the affidavit as containing "extensive
evidence of drug activity and gun possession." Id. 12, 590 N.W.2d at 195.
193. Id. 13, 590 N.W.2d at 196. The court also briefly addressed two other issues. First, the
court noted that the issuing judge acted as the judge who reviewed the probable cause determination.
Id. 14. The court explained that an issuing judge is strongly encouraged to attempt to have another
judge review the probable cause determination. Id. 1 18 (citing State v. Hage, 1997 N.D. 175, 9 n.l,
568 N.W.2d 741, 744 n.l). However, since the judge was not required to have another judge review
the probable cause determination and since there was no indication of bias, "the unobjected-to review
of a warrant by the issuer does not create a problem." Id. 1 20, 590 N.W.2d at 197.
The second issue the court briefly addressed involved the defendant's right to a speedy trial.
Id. 21. Pointing out that the defendant's case "proceeded on a timely basis," that some of the delays
were the defendant's fault, and that the defendant did not properly comply with the Uniform
Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, the court concluded that the defendant was not denied his
right to a speedy trial. Id. 1 22-24.
194. 1999 N.D. 1, 588 N.W.2d 847.
195. State v. Herrick, 1999 N.D. 1, 7, 588 N.W.2d 847, 848-49.
196. State v. Herrick, 1997 N.D. 155, 567 N.W.2d 336. See also North Dakota Supreme Court
Review, 74 N.D. L. REv. 601, 601-04 (1998).
197. Herrick, 6, 588 N.W.2d at 848.
198. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
199. Herrick, (N 7, 28, 588 N.W.2d at 848, 852.
200. Id. 1 4, 588 N.W.2d at 848.
201. Id. (tf 2-4.
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evidence found in the search, Herrick argued that the issuance and
execution of the no-knock warrant violated his state and federal constitu-
tional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.202 In the first
appeal, the supreme court determined that North Dakota Century Code §
19-03.1-32(3) requires probable cause for a no-knock entry, and a per
se rule allowing no-knock warrants in all drug cases is unconstitu-
tional.203
Noting that North Dakota's requirement of probable cause is more
stringent than the federal requirement of reasonable suspicion, the court
looked to remedies for constitutional violations for help in determining
an appropriate remedy for the statutory violation in this case.204 Con-
cluding that suppression would be the logical remedy, based on the
similarity of the rights involved, the court determined the good-faith ex-
ception described in Leon must be considered. 205 The court then noted
the four situations identified in Leon in which a police officer's reliance
on a warrant could not be objectively reasonable and the good-faith
exception would therefore not apply. 206 Herrick argued that the third of
these exceptions, "when the warrant was based on an affidavit 'so lack-
ing in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable,"' applied to his case.207
In response, the supreme court noted that before Herrick's first
appeal, the law in North Dakota clearly established the propriety of a per
se rule allowing no-knock warrants in cases where the presence of drugs
is suspected.208 Therefore, at the time of the search, the officers would




204. Id. - 8-10, 588 N.W.2d at 849. The Legislature did not specify a remedy for violations of
N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-32(3). Id. 1 10.
205. Id. 1 10-12. The holding of Leon is summarized as: "[E]vidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate need not be excluded, as a matter of federal law, from the
case in chief of federal and state criminal prosecutions." Id. 1 14, 588 N.W.2d at 849-50 (quoting
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 927 (1984) (Blackman, J., concurring)).
206. Id. 15, 588 N.W.2d at 850. These four situations are:
1) when the issuing magistrate was misled by false information intentionally or
negligently given by the affiant; 2) when the magistrate totally abandoned her judicial
role and failed to act in a neutral and detached manner; 3) when the warrant was based
on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable'; and 4) when a reasonable law enforcement officer
could not rely on a facially deficient warrant.
Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).
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Herrick also argued that the North Dakota Constitution affords
greater protections than the federal constitution, and therefore the good-
faith exception should not apply to his case. 210 The court rejected this
argument, distinguishing Pennsylvania's rejection of the good-faith ex-
ception, even though Pennsylvania's corresponding constitutional pro-
vision is nearly identical to North Dakota's. 211 The court noted further
that the issue in this case was one of violation of a statute, not a consti-
tutional violation. 212 With this observation, the court limited its holding
to per se no-knock warrants issued before the first Herrick case, 213 hold-
ing that for such warrants the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applies.214
Justice Sandstrom concurred separately, noting that the North
Dakota Constitution need not necessarily grant more protections than the
federal constitution. 215 He points out that Fourth Amendment limita-
tions only applied to the federal government until 1961, and the framers
of the North Dakota Constitution most likely intended nothing more
than to guarantee the public the same protection from the state govern-
ment as they had from the federal government via the Fourth
Amendment. 216
Justice Maring, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed
with the majority that violations of North Dakota Century Code Section
19-03.1-32 should be remedied by the exclusionary rule. 217 However,
she disagreed with the majority's limitation of its holding, arguing
instead for a decision whether to adopt or reject a good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule. 218
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
STATE V. OVERBY
In State v. Overby,2 19 the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed
for the first time whether a warrantless search preceding arrest is reason-
210. Id. 21,588 N.W.2d at 851.
211. Id. I 22-26, 588 N.W.2d at 851-52 (noting that "we have not unequivocally distinguished
privacy as the major factor in applying the exclusionary rule to Article I, Section 8, [North Dakota's
equivalent to the Fourth Amendment]").
212. Id. 26, 588 N.W.2d at 852.
213. Id1 27 (citing State v. Herrick, 1997 N.D. 155, 567 N.W.2d 336).
214. Id. 1 27-28.
215. Id. U 32-37, 588 N.W.2d at 852-53.
216. Id. 1 34-36.
217. Id. 40, 588 N.W.2d at 854.
218. Id. 1 55, 588 N.W.2d at 857.
219. 1999 N.D. 47, 590 N.W.2d 703.
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able under the Fourth Amendment. 220 The court followed several other
jurisdictions in embracing the United States Supreme Court's holding, in
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 221 that so long as probable cause exists before the
search and the formal arrest follows "quickly on the heels" of the
search, a warrantless search incident to arrest can happen before the
arrest, so long as the fruits of the search are "not necessary to support
probable cause to arrest." 222
Dale Overby was arrested for possession of marijuana and drug
paraphernalia after the police officer who had pulled him over for a
broken tail light noticed the odor of marijuana coming out of his car. 223
Overby had been "fiddling around with something, stuffing something
or doing something with his right pocket," according to the officer, so
the officer searched him and found the contraband. 224
Overby moved to suppress the fruits of the search on the grounds
that the search violated Terry v. Ohio.225 The district court held the
search unreasonable under Terry but reasonable as a search incident to
arrest.226 The supreme court agreed with the district court that the search
was valid as incident to arrest and therefore the Terry issues did not need
to be reached. 227 In adopting the Rawlings holding, the court stated that
for the officer's search to be reasonable, he must have had probable
cause to arrest Overby before searching him and the arrest had to be
sufficiently contemporaneous with the search.228 Noting that the officer
was "well trained in identifying the odor of marijuana" and that Overby
was alone in the car when the officer stopped it, the court concluded the
officer had probable cause to arrest Overby before the search was
conducted. 229 As the search preceded the arrest by only a few minutes, it
was a valid search incident to arrest under the newly adopted test.230
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred specially to express concern
that "a warrantless search prior to arrest should be the exception to the
normal practice of a search following arrest." 231 Hoping that this opin-
ion does not foster searching prior to arrest as the normal practice, he
noted:
220. State v. Overby, 1999 N.D. 47, e 8, 590 N.W.2d 703, 705-06.
221. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
222. Overby, 8, 590 N.W.2d at 706.
223. Id. -I 2-3. 590 N.W.2d at 704-05.
224. Id.
225. Id. 4, 590 N.W.2d at 705 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
226. Id.
227. Id. 6.
228. Id. 1 9, 590 N.W.2d at 706.
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Police officers who might be encouraged by this opinion to
adopt that practice and prosecutors should be aware that on
appeal we will continue to closely examine the facts prior to the
search to determine if probable cause to arrest is present with-
out regard to any evidence which might be discovered during
the search preceding the arrest.232
FAMILY LAW-ALTERNATING PHYSICAL CUSTODY
BOTNEN v. LUKENS
In Botnen,233 the court encountered a custody dispute involving the
biological mother, the biological father, and the maternal grandparents
of a child.234 The court concluded that the grandparents had failed to
show exceptional circumstances warranting a custody award in their
favor, 235 but that the trial court had not sufficiently indicated that an
alternating physical custody arrangement was in the child's best
interests. 236 The court thus remanded the case for reconsideration. 237
Hunter James Botnen Lukens was born on August 20, 1997.238 In
September, 1997, his mother, Kathryn Lukens, went to Georgia to attend
college and participate in track, 239 and Kathryn's parents, Fred and Jane
Lukens, began to care for Hunter.240 After becoming unhappy with the
visitation he was afforded, Nathan Botnen, Hunter's biological father,
sought custody, proposing that he and Kathryn be awarded joint legal
custody and that he be awarded physical custody. 241 Kathryn counter-
claimed for custody. 242 In addition, Fred and Jane Lukens intervened,
seeking custody if Kathryn was not awarded custody.243
Finding that there had been "grandparental bonding" but "not
psychological parental bonding" with the grandparents, the trial court
denied the grandparents' motion for custody. 244 The trial court awarded
joint legal custody and alternating physical custody to Nathan and
232. Id. 17, 590 N.W.2d at 708.
233. 1998 N.D. 224, 587 N.W.2d 141.
234. Botnen v. Lukens, 1998 N.D. 224, 2, 587 N.W.2d 141, 143.
235. Id. I 8, 587 N.W.2d at 144.
236. Id. 16, 587 N.W.2d at 145-46.
237. Id.
238. Id. 2, 587 N.W.2d at 143.
239. Kathryn went to the University of Georgia on a track scholarship. Id.
240. Id. Fred and Jane Lukens live in Aneta, North Dakota. Id.
241. Id. Nathan desired for Kathryn to be granted liberal visitation. Id.
242. Id. Kathryn also desired for Nathan to be granted reasonable visitation. Id.
243. Id. In the event they were awarded custody, Fred and Jane desired that both Nathan and
Kathryn be granted reasonable visitation. Id.
244. Id. 13.
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Kathryn, contingent upon Kathryn's "opt[ing] to interrupt her educa-
tional and athletic aspirations" for two years. 245
Kathryn and the grandparents appealed.246 Kathryn argued that the
trial court erred in admitting expert evidence and abused its discretion in
awarding joint physical custody. 247 The grandparents argued that the
trial court clearly erred in denying their motion for custody and in
awarding joint physical custody.248
The court first considered the grandparents' motion for custody. 249
The court acknowledged that parents generally have custodial rights to
their children which are superior to the rights of any other persons. 250
The court further stressed that a custody award to the grandparents as
opposed to a child's natural parents is clearly erroneous unless "excep-
tional circumstances require that such a custody disposition be made in
the best interests of the child."251 Turning to the facts of the case, the
court pointed out that the trial court had found no psychological par-
ental bonding between Hunter and the grandparents and that there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding of exceptional circumstances
warranting grandparental custody. 252 The court consequently held that
245. Id. The trial court's custody arrangement was as follows:
Nate shall have Hunter every weekend from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at
6:00 p.m. until the weekend following Katie's completion of her current spring academic
quarter. Thereafter, and throughout July 1998, the parties shall alternate week-long
visitation periods from Sunday at 6:00 p.m. through the following Friday at 6:00 p.m.
Commencing August 2, 1998, the week-long visitation periods shall be expanded to
alternating two week periods through October 1998. Thereafter, the visitations shall be
alternated monthly through February 1999 and then, when Hunter is approximately one
and one half years old, the visitation periods shall alternate every four months until he
reaches school age, subject to exceptions stated below. At that time, and again unless the
parties have mutually agreed otherwise, the Court will re-address visitation in light of
Hunter's school schedule.
Should Katie reconsider her words to the Court on March 26th and opt to continue
her education and athletic endeavors without interruption at the University of Georgia,
Plaintiff Nathan Botnen shall be Hunter's designated physical custodial parent, with




248. Id., 587 N.W.2d at 143-44.
249. Id. 4, 587 N.W.2d at 144. The court noted that the trial court's finding would not be re-
versed unless it was clearly erroneous. Id. 5 (citing Goter v. Goter, 1997 N.D. 28, 8, 559 N.W.2d
834. 836).
250. Id. (citing Goter, 7, 559 N.W.2d at 836).
251. Id. 1 6 (citing Hust v. Hust, 295 N.W.2d 316, 319 (N.D. 1980)). The court similarly recog-
nized that it "cannot award custody to a third party, rather than the natural parent, under a best interest
of the child test unless it first determines that exceptional circumstances exist to trigger the
best-interest analysis." Id. (citing Worden v. Worden, 434 N.w.2d 341, 342 (N.D. 1989)).
252. Id. 8 . The court also declined the grandparents' invitation to abandon the exceptional
circumstances requirement. Id. 1 7.
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the trial court's denial of the grandparents' motion was not clearly
erroneous. 253
The court then analyzed Kathryn's contention that the trial court
had erroneously admitted expert testimony. 254 Kathryn had specifically
argued that testimony of Dr. Searcy, a clinical psychologist involved with
Altru Health System's Child Evaluation and Treatment Program, should
not have been admitted. 255 Kathryn stressed that Dr. Searcy had not
interviewed or evaluated Hunter.256
The court recognized that evidentiary rules give the trial judge wide
latitude in deciding whether evidence is relevant or whether expert
evidence would be helpful. 257 Further, the court noted that it would not
reverse the trial court's decision unless it had abused its discretion. 258
With that deference, the court found that a psychological expert could
provide the trial court with a general understanding of the traits and
needs of children as they develop, which could be helpful in determining
which person is best situated to raise a child.259 Reasoning that the trial
court could have reasonably determined that Dr. Searcy's testimony
about child development would be helpful, the court concluded that the
trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting Dr. Searcy's
testimony. 260
Finally, the court reached the contention that the trial court's
alternating physical custody arrangement was clearly erroneous. 261 The
court stressed that "rotating the residence of a very young child [is]
presumptively not in the child's best interests." 262 The court further




256. Id. In support, Kathryn had relied primarily on the following excerpt from Weber v. Weber,
512 N.W.2d 723, 727 (N.D. 1994): "(In the absence of a complete study of all the parties, there is
logical frailty in applying a general premise to a specific case." Id.
257. Id. 1 10-12, 587 N.W.2d at 144-45. The court specifically noted that rule 401 of the North
Dakota Rules of Evidence described relevant evidence as "evidence that reasonably and actually
tends to prove or disprove any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." Id. I 11,
587 N.W.2d at 144. In addition, the court reviewed rule 702 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence
which provides for the admission of expert testimony if such testimony will assist the trier of fact in
understanding or determining an fact in issue. Id. 1 12, 587 N.W.2d at 145. Moreover, the court noted
that precedent established that the issue of "whether expert testimony is useful ... falls within the trial
court's sound discretion." Id. (citing State v. Steinbach, 1998 N.D. 18, 12, 575 N.W.2d 193, 197).
258. Id. 1 11, 587 N.W.2d at 144-45.
259. Id. 1 13, 587 N.W.2d at 145 (citing 2 SANDRA MORGANLrrrLE, CHILD CUSTODY AND VisrrA-
"nON LAW AND PRAcnca § 11.07 (1998)).
260. Id.
261. Id. 14.
262. Id. (citing 2 SANDRA MORGAN L rrrLE, C HILD C USTODY AND V IsrrAnON L AW AND PRACTICE §
13.06(4)).
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trial court's findings must show that such arrangement is in the child's
best interests. 263
Considering the specific facts, the court pointed out that the trial
court had intended to compel the parents to assume parental responsibil-
ities, to promote communication between the parties with Hunter's long
term interests in mind, and to permit both parents to share equally in
Hunter's childhood.264 The court, however, stressed that the trial court's
intentions could be achieved "with less disruption in Hunter's care" by
giving one parent primary physical custody and allowing the other
parent liberal visitation. 265 Moreover, the court noted that the trial court
had not made findings indicating that alternating physical custody was in
Hunter's best interests. 266 The court therefore remanded the case for
reconsideration. 267
FAMILY LAW-CHILD SUPPORT-EMPLOYER-PAID BENEFITS INCLUDED AS
INCOME
LAWRENCE V. DELKAMP
In Lawrence v. Delkamp,26 8 John Lawrence appealed the district
court's decision to increase his child support obligations. 269 Concluding
that Lawrence's employer-paid benefits were properly included as
income in the calculation of his child support obligation, the court
affirmed the district court's decision. 270
In 1992, John Lawrence and Tina Delkamp had a child.271 Law-
rence initially had custody of the child, but Delkamp obtained custody
in 1995.272 At that time, the district court set Lawrence's child support
payments at $540 per month. 273 During the following year, the district
court decreased Lawrence's child support obligation to $200 per
month. 274 In 1997, Delkamp moved to set a new child support obliga-
tion.275 The district court then increased Lawrence's child support obli-
gation to $942 per month. 276 In calculating Lawrence's obligation, the
263. Id. (citing Kasprowicz v. Kasprowicz, 1998 N.D. 68, 1 68, 575 N.W.2d 921, 924).
264. Id. 116.
265. Id., 587 N.W.2d at 145-46.
266. Id., 587 N.W.2d at 146.
267. Id.
268. 1998 N.D. 178, 584 N.W.2d 515.
269. Lawrence v. Delkamp, 1998 N.D. 178, 18, 584 N.W.2d 515, 517.
270. Id. 22, 584 N.W.2d at 519.
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court considered his tax-exempt income and benefits. Specifically, the
court included the following employer contributions: 401k payments,
medical insurance premiums, dental insurance premiums, life insurance
premiums, accidental death and disability insurance premiums, long term
disability insurance premiums, and pension fund contributions. 277
Lawrence appealed the district court's decision to increase his child
support obligation, arguing that the district court erred in including the
employer-paid benefits in its calculation of his obligation. 278
The court began by reviewing two definitions of "income." First,
the court noted that the North Dakota Century Code broadly defined
"income" as "any form of payment, regardless of source . . .including
any earned, unearned, taxable or nontaxable income . . . annuity and
retirement benefits." 279 Second, the court turned to the state's child
support guidelines, in which "gross income" included "income from
any source, in any form ... includ[ing] salaries, wages, overtime wages,
commissions, bonuses, deferred income, dividends, severance pay, [and]
pensions ."280
The court then considered the specific employer-paid contributions
at issue. The court noted that Lawrence's employer paid premiums on
Lawrence's behalf for dental, life, long-term disability, and accidental
death and disability insurance. 281 Applying the two broad definitions of
"income," the court concluded that the contributions were properly
included in the child support calculation. 282 The court specifically
categorized the employer-paid benefits as "deferred income" 283 and as
"income from any source." Consequently, the court held that the
district court did not clearly err by considering those benefits in comput-
ing the child support obligation.284
277. Id. When combined with Lawrence's contribution to a cafeteria plan to reimburse for medi-
cal expenses not covered by insurance, these benefits totaled $13,627. Id.
278. Id. 1 10, 584 N.W.2d at 517. In addition, the Department of Human Services (DHS) filed
an amicus brief. Id. 8. In its brief, the DHS argued that including employer-paid benefits as gross
income for child support obligation calculations was contrary to its intent. Id.
279. Id. 1 12 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09.10(8)). The court also observed that the
federal government required "income" for child support purposes to consider "all earning and income
of the absent parent." Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(c)(1)).
280. Id. 14, 584 N.W.2d at 518 (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-01(5)). The court spe-
cifically stressed the guidelines' inclusion of "deferred income." Id. (underlining "deferred income"
in the opinion).
281. At trial, a representative of the employer even testified that Lawrence did not pay any
premiums for such insurance. Id. 16.
282. Id. 19, 584 N.W.2d at 519 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09.10(8) and N.D. ADMIN.
CODE § 75-02-04.1-01(5)). The court also reasoned that since his employer was paying the insurance
premiums, Lawrence did not have to spend his own income on them. Id. 1 17, 584 N.W.2d at 518.
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The court also briefly dismissed two other issues. First, the court
noted that Lawrence argued that if payments to pension plans were
considered as income now, he will be subject to a "double taxation-
like" penalty since the payments also will be considered income when
they are paid out during his retirement. 285 Reasoning that the issue was
not presented by the facts before it, the court declined to address it
further.286 The second issue involved whether Lawrence's rights to any
of his employer's contributions were vested.287 In disposing of the issue,
the court stressed that requiring an obligee to prove that the obligor's
rights were vested would impose too great a burden on the obligee and
that the obligor here, Lawrence, had readily available information
regarding whether his rights were vested.288
In his concurrence, Chief Justice VandeWalle, joined by Justice
Sandstrom, focused on two points. First, he desired to emphasize that the
court was not deciding whether an employer's contributions under a
compulsory pension plan to which the employee has no access was
income for child support determinations. 289 Second, he voiced concern
regarding whether pension payments were to be included as income both
going into the plan and coming out the plan.290
FAMILY LAW-CUSTODIAL PARENT'S REQUEST TO MOVE CHILD OUT OF STATE
KELLER v. KELLER
In Keller,29' the court found that the trial court had clearly erred in
denying the custodial mother's request to move her child to Indiana. 292
The court thus reversed and remanded with instructions for the trial
court to allow the mother and her child to move.293
Karen and Michael Keller married in 1982 and had a daughter,
Beth, in 1984.294 In 1991, the couple separated and Michael remained
in Grafton, North Dakota while Karen and Beth went to East Grand
Forks, Minnesota to live with Karen's parents. 295 The following year,




289. Id. 1 24 (noting that although a similar situation arose in Shipley v. Shipley, 509 N.W.2d 49
(N.D. 1993), the issue was not resolved).
290. Id. 25, 584 N.W.2d at 520.
291. 1998 N.D. 179, 584 N.W.2d 509.
292. Keller v. Keller, 1998 N.D. 179, 1, 584 N.W.2d 509, 510.
293. Id.
294. Id. 2, 584 N.W.2d at 510-11.
295. Id. 3, 584 N.W.2d at 511. The couple had moved to Grafton in 1984. Id. 1 2, 584 N.W.2d
at 510.
1999] 681
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Karen and Michael divorced. 296 Karen received physical custody of
Beth, and Michael enjoyed liberal visitation.2 97 In 1996, Karen, in
pursuit of a doctoral degree in clinical psychology, secured an internship
position in Indiana. 298
While maintaining frequent contact with Beth, Karen and Michael
let Karen's parents care for Beth.2 99 However, in April 1997, the flood
of the Red River destroyed Karen's parents' home. 300 In addition,
Karen's mother became ill and her father had a stroke. 301 Karen then
took an emergency leave and contemplated her options. 30 2 After con-
sulting with Dr. Ken Carlson, a Grand Forks psychologist, and Dr. Chuck
Barke, the chairperson of the Counseling and Psychology Department at
the University of North Dakota, and being advised that the flood had
eliminated the area's job opportunities, Karen decided to return to
Indiana with Beth.303
Beth adjusted quickly to the move. 304 However, after discovering
that she was violating the custody judgment, Karen returned to live with
her family. 305 Karen then filed this motion requesting permission to
move with Beth to Indiana. 306 The trial court denied the motion, and
Karen appealed. 30 7
On review, the court first acknowledged that a custodial parent must
obtain judicial permission to move with his or her child to another state
unless the noncustodial parent consents to the move. 30 8 The court
further noted that the custodial parent has the burden of proving the
move is in the child's best interests. 309 In addition, the court recognized
that the trial court's decision would not be reversed unless it was clearly
erroneous. 310
296. Id. 14, 584 N.W.2d at 511.
297. Id. Michael's visitation included visits every other weekend, specified holidays, and five
summer weeks. Id.
298. Id. 1 6. Prior to the internship, Karen was allowed to complete most of her studies while
living and working in East Grand Forks. Id.
299. Id. 7. Karen moved alone to Indiana, Michael remained in Grafton, and Beth stayed at





304. Id. j 9. Beth visited a parochial school and registered to attend there. Id.
305. Id. Actually, in June, Karen and Beth returned to East Grand Forks to allow Michael and
Beth to enjoy a summer visit. Id. After the visit, Karen and Beth went back to Indiana and Beth
attended about seventeen days of school. Id. Then Karen learned that she would face contempt
charges for violating the custody arrangement if they did not return to East Grand Forks. Id.
306. Id., 584 N.W.2d at 511-12.
307. Id., 584 N.W.2d at 512.
308. Id. 1 10 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-07).
309. Id. (citing Paulson v. Bauske, 1998 N.D. 17, 1 6, 574 N.W.2d 801, 802).
310. Id. (citing N.D. R. Civ. P. 52(a)). The court also explained that a finding is clearly
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The court then explained that a four-factor analysis must be applied
to determine whether a move is in the best interests of the child.311
Under the analysis, the following factors are examined:
1) [t]he prospective advantages of the move in improving the
custodial parent's and child's quality of life, 2) [tlhe integrity
of the custodial parent's motive for relocation, considering
whether it is to defeat or deter visitation by the noncustodial
parent, 3) [t]he integrity of the noncustodial parent's motives
for opposing the move, [and] 4) [w]hether there is a realistic
opportunity for visitation which can provide an adequate basis
for preserving and fostering the noncustodial parent's relation-
ship with the child if relocation is allowed, and the likelihood
that each parent will comply with such alternative visitation. 312
Observing that the trial court had determined factors one and four
to be dispositive, the court turned to those two factors. 313 The court first
considered the trial court's finding that Karen had failed to substantiate
an economic advantage for the move. 314 The court pointed out that
Karen had secured a position in an Indiana clinic with "excellent salary
and benefits." 315 The court also recognized that it would be very
difficult for Karen to acquire a license to practice psychology in North
Dakota because the school that she had attended was not A.P.A. certified
and because doctors Carlson and Barke advised her that there were no
job opportunities in the area similar to her Indiana opportunities. 316
Consequently, the court concluded that the trial court's finding that
Karen had failed to substantiate economic advantage by the move was
clearly erroneous. 317
The court then analyzed the trial court's finding regarding the
fourth factor. 318 Criticizing the trial court's conclusion that visitation
could not be restructured to provide for Beth's best interests, the court
stressed that "a visitation schedule which provides less frequent, but
erroneous "if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if,
although there is some evidence to support it, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. (citing Sumra v. Sumra, 1997 N.D. 62, 1 8, 561
N.W.2d 290, 293).
311. Id. I 11.
312. Id. (citing Stout v. Stout, 1997 N.D. 61, 134, 560 N.W.2d 903, 913-14).
313. Id. 12. The trial court had concluded that "neither parent lacked integrity or valid purpose
in that parent's position regarding the move." Id.
314. Id. 1 13.
315. Id. 14. The trial court also had recognized that if Karen acquired her license, she would
receive a 14% increase in pay. Id.
316. Id. 15, 584 N.W.2d at 513. The court further noted that these doctors were "highly
regarded professionals with long-standing in the Grand Forks community." Id. In addition, the court
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extended, visitation periods will preserve a non-custodial parent's right
to foster and develop a relationship with the child."319 The court further
noted that Beth was well adjusted and studious and that she very much
wanted to live in Indiana with her mother. 320 The court similarly noted
that since Beth's move back to North Dakota, Beth's grades had slipped
and she had become less interested in extra-curricular activities. 321 Thus,
the court rejected as clearly erroneous the trial court's finding that
visitation could not be restructured to provide for Beth's best interests.322





In Hawkinson v. Hawkinson,324 the supreme court reworded the
fourth Stout factor for determining whether an out-of-state relocation
would be in the best interest of the child.325 It did so to "make explicit
that determining the best interests of the child requires consideration of
both positive and negative impacts of the proposed move." 326
Donald Hawkinson appealed from a trial court judgment granting
his former spouse Lynda McAllister's request to move with their son to
Plymouth, Minnesota. 327 Lynda's new husband was reassigned and
promoted, requiring the move to Minnesota. 328 A detailed visitation
schedule for Donald was established by the court. 329
The supreme court began its examination by noting that "[tihe trial
court's decision whether the move is in the best interests of the child is a
finding of fact and will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly
319. Id. (citing Matter of B.E.M., 1997 N.D. 134, 1 20, 566 N.W.2d 414, 418). "By allowing lib-
eral visitation during the summer months and vacations the court can restructure the visitation schedule
to foster a meaningful relationship between Michael and Beth." Id. (citing Burich v. Burich, 314
N.W.2d 82, 88 (N.D. 1981)).
320. Id. 17. The court also acknowledged that Beth liked the private school she attended in
Indiana. Id. Further, the court stressed that the child's preference is a factor the trial court may
consider in determining the child's best interests. Id. I 18 (citing Surma v. Sumra, 1997 N.D. 62, 14,
561 N.W.2d 290, 294).
321. Id. 1 19. The court then pointed out that the trial court neither indicated that it gave
consideration to Beth's preference nor clarified why it should discount her preference. Id.
322. Id. 16.
323. Id. 20, 584 N.W.2d at 513-14.
324. 1999 N.D. 58, 591 N.W.2d 144.
325. Hawkinson v. Hawkinson, 1999 N.D. 58, 9, 591 N.W.2d 144, 147.
326. Id.
327. Id. 1, 591 N.W.2d at 145.
328. Id. l3, 591 N.W.2d at 146.
329. Id. 4.
[VOL. 75:655
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
erroneous." 330 The court then described the four-factor analysis enunci-
ated in Stout v. Stout.331 The four factors that the trial court must
balance when making its decision are:
1) the prospective advantages of the move in improving the
custodial parent's and child's quality of life; 2) the integrity of
the custodial parent's motive for relocation, considering
whether it is to defeat or deter visitation by the noncustodial
parent; 3) the integrity of the noncustodial parent's motives for
opposing the move; and 4) whether there is a realistic opportu-
nity for visitation which can provide an adequate basis for
preserving and fostering the noncustodial parent's relationship
with the child if relocation is allowed, and the likelihood that
each parent will comply with such alternate visitation.
332
Donald argued that Stout did not make clear that possible disadvan-
tages to the move need to be weighed when deciding whether the move is
in the best interest of the child.333 The court seemed to agree, changing
the fourth Stout factor to recognize explicitly the need to balance
potential negative impact.334 The fourth Stout factor now reads:
4) The potential negative impact on the relationship between
the noncustodial parent and the child, including whether there
is a realistic opportunity for visitation which can provide an
adequate basis for preserving and fostering the noncustodial
parent's relationship with the child if relocation is allowed, and
the likelihood that each parent will comply with such alternate
visitation. 335
Even though the trial court in Hawkinson lacked this clarified version of
the fourth factor, the supreme court found that it had properly balanced
the Stout factors, and so its decision to grant Lynda's motion was not
clearly erroneous. 336
Justice Maring concurred specially to note her disagreement with
the majority's decision to reword the fourth Stout factor. 337 She argued
that a careful reading of the Stout opinion supports the need to balance
the potential negative impact on the relationship between the child and
330. Id. 5.
331. Id. 6 (citing Stout v. Stout, 1997 N.D. 61, 34, 560 N.W.2d 903, 914-15). See also North
Dakota Supreme Court Review, 73 N.D. L. REv. 570, 570-73 (1997) (describing Stout and the Stout
factors).
332. Hawkinson, 6, 591 N.W.2d at 146 (citing Stout, 34, 560 N.W.2d at 914-15).
333. Id. 7, 591 N.W.2d at 146.
334. Id. 9, 591 N.W.2d at 147.
335. Id.
336. Id. 18, 591 N.W.2d at 148.
337. Id. 24, 591 N.W.2d at 149.
6851999]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW




In Whitmire v. Whitmire,339 Burton Whitmire appealed from a judg-
ment modifying his child support payments and awarding his ex-wife
attorney fees. 340 The supreme court held that the district court erred in
imputing income to Burton from his residence and awarding attorney
fees without proper documentation and remanded for further pro-
ceedings. 341
The district court imputed to Burton $350 monthly as rental income
from a basement apartment in Burton's home. 342 Burton had rented the
apartment out for that amount in the past, but, at the time of this action,
his brother was living there and paying no rent. 343 The supreme court
noted the child support guidelines expressly preclude imputation of
income from an obligor's residence. 344 However, if Burton chose to
receive rental income from his basement apartment, that income would
be included in his gross income for determining his child support
obligation. 345
The district court also imputed $200 monthly as income from a
house Burton bought. 346 Burton had rented the house to his sister for
$200 a month, but he testified that he had given it to his parents because
he did not want to be responsible for the taxes on it.347 The district court
had found this to be a gratuitous transfer for the purpose of decreasing
his income for child support purposes, and the supreme court concluded
that this finding was supported by the record and not clearly
erroneous. 348 So, unlike the imputed rental income from the basement
338. Id. 1124-25.
339. 1999 N.D. 56, 591 N.W.2d 126.
340. Whitmire v. Whitmire, 1999 N.D. 56, 1 1,591 N.W.2d 126, 127. See also Whitmire v. Whit-
mire, 1997 N.D. 214, 570 N.W.2d 231 (reversing the Second Amended Judgment); North Dakota
Supreme Court Review, 74 N.D. L. REV. 604, 604-06 (1998) (describing the 1997 case).
341. Whitmire, 1 1,591 N.W.2d at 127.
342. Id. 9, 591 N.W.2d at 129.
343. Id.
344. Id. "The guidelines prevent an obligor from being forced to lease all or any part of his
residence." Id.
345. Id. 9 n.1.
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apartment, the imputed rental income from the house was allowed by the
supreme court.349
Burton also claimed that res judicata precluded the district court
from awarding his former spouse attorney fees, as an earlier judgment re-
quired the parties to pay their own attorney fees. 350 The supreme court
noted that the earlier judgment was reversed in the previous Whitmire
case, 35 1 and a reversed judgment cannot serve as res judicata. 352 The
court also noted that the trial court had reserved the attorney fee issue
for a later date. 353 As trial courts have continuing jurisdiction in divorce
actions regarding post-judgment matters, the supreme court concluded
the trial court retained jurisdiction to deal with the attorney fee issue for
services relating to Burton's June 1996 motion for change of custody
and everything after that.354
However, Burton's complaint regarding the itemization of the
attorney fee request received the agreement of the court. 355 Stating that
"[a]n award of attorney fees must generally be supported by evidence
upon which the court can determine the requested fees are reasonable
and legitimate," the court concluded that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in awarding attorney fees without the proper documentation. 356 The
supreme court thus reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 357
FAMILY LAW-DIVORCE-CHILD SUPPORT
BARTH V. BARTH
In Barth v. Barth,358 the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
disallowal of Dale Barth's farm expenses in the calculation of his child
support payments as a sanction for discovery abuse. 359 As a result, the
court affirmed the trial court's judgment. 360
349. See id. 7-9, 591 N.W.2d at 128-29.
350. Id. 1 10, 591 N.W.2d at 129.
351. Whitmire v. Whitmire, 1997 N.D. 214, 570 N.W.2d 231.
352. Whitmire, 11, 591 N.W.2d at 129-30.
353. Id. 1 12, 591 N.W.2d at 130.
354. Id. 1 13. Judges Maurice R. Hunke and Gerald G. Glaser, sitting in place of Justice Sand-
strom and Justice Kapsner, each concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. 20-22. 591 N.W.2d at
131. They were of the opinion that the attorney fee issue was not reserved for a later date, but that it
was in fact decided when the trial judge entered the third amended judgment, which stated that the
parties were to pay their own fees. Id. 1 20. Based on this, they would limit fees to those for services
rendered after the third amended judgment was entered. Id. 1 21.
355. Id. 14, 591 N.W.2d at 130.
356. Id. 9t 14-15.
357. Id. 16-17.
358. 1999 N.D. 91, 593 N.W.2d 359.
359. Barth v. Barth, 1999 N.D. 91, 1 35, 593 N.W.2d 359, 367.
360. Id. 137.
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Dale and Nancy Barth divorced, and Nancy was awarded custody of
their children.361 Dale was ordered to pay child support. 362 As Dale was
a farmer, an average of the most recent five years of farm operations had
to be used to determine his income for calculating his child support
obligation.363 Dale refused to comply with the court's orders to produce
his tax returns. 364 In fact, he didn't produce his 1997 tax return until
three days before the trial, and he never produced the supporting docu-
mentation that the court needed to make an accurate determination of
his average income. 365
At trial, Dale tried to use hand signals to keep his father from
testifying as to how many cattle their operation owned. 366 Dale's efforts
did not go unnoticed, and the trial court admonished him and made sure
the record reflected his activities. 367 As a sanction for Dale's "extreme,
persistent, and willful" discovery misconduct, the trial court included
unreported income and excluded farm expense deductions when calcu-
lating Dale's income from farming for determining his child support
obligation. 368 Examining "this deep record of intentional delay, eva-
sion, and nonresponsiveness," the supreme court concluded that the trial
court had not abused its discretion. 369
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred specially, expressing his "con-
cern with the use of child-support guidelines as a sanction vehicle." 370
He noted "[c]hild support should not be the football tossed between the
parents in an attempt to out maneuver one another as they dissolve the
family." 37 1 He urged trial courts to seek other sanctions before manipu-
lating child support levels, as "[d]istortions of the guidelines for one
purpose only serve to encourage that distortion for other purposes." 372
361. Id. 1 3, 593 N.W.2d at 361.
362. Id.
363. Id. 28, 593 N.W.2d at 365.
364. Id. 35, 593 N.W.2d at 367.
365. Id. 33, 593 N.W.2d at 366.
366. Id. 34.
367. Id.
368. Id. 35, 593 N.W.2d at 367 (citations omitted).
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FAMILY LAW-PARENT AND CHILD--. VISITATION
HENDRICKSON V. HENDRICKSON
In Hendrickson v. Hendrickson,373 the North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed a trial court order directing the non-custodial parent's child
support payments be placed in an interest-bearing escrow account for
the benefit of the children as a remedy for the custodial parent's frustra-
tion of visitation. 374 Concluding that such an order is not a proper
remedy, the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court to
consider alternatives. 375
Mark and Diane Hendrickson divorced in 1995; Diane was awarded
custody of the couple's four children and Mark was granted visita-
tion. 376 After several complaints that Diane was frustrating visitation and
alienating the children from him, Mark brought this change of custody
action. 377 The trial judge, frustrated with Diane's continuing pattern of
alienating behavior yet not wanting to harm the children by jailing their
custodial parent, ordered that Mark's child support payments be placed
in an escrow account for the children's higher education as a punish-
ment for Diane's behavior. 378
The supreme court concluded that this remedy was improper and
instructed the trial court to consider alternatives. 379 The court noted that,
while it understood the trial judge's frustration, the guidelines make no
provision for such a procedure. 380 The court explained that child sup-
port is to be paid to the custodial parent to provide for the child's
expenses 38 1 and "is presumed to benefit the children not the custodial
parent and should not be used as a wedge or a club to force compliance
with the court's orders." 382 The court suggested as an alternative a jail
sentence that could be served at a time that would not interfere with
Diane's work, so that she would not lose her job, house, and car. 383 This
would also give Mark a chance to repair his relationship with his
children. 384
373. 1999 N.D. 37, 590 N.W.2d 220.
374. Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 1999 N.D. 37, 8, 590 N.W.2d 220, 223.
375. Id.
376. Id. 1 2, 590 N.W.2d at 221.
377. Id. U 2-4, 590 N.W.2d at 221-22.
378. Id. 4, 590 N.W.2d at 222.
379. Id. 8, 590 N.W.2d at 223.
380. Id. H 8-9.
381. Id. 19.
382. Id. 1 10.
383. Id. 1 12.
384. Id.
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As to the change of custody request, the court noted that parental
alienation and persistent frustration of visitation can be relevant factors
in determining the first prong of the change of custody test, a "signifi-
cant change in circumstances." 385 The court recognized that, although
change of custody should not be the initial response to parental misbe-
havior, "a change in custody may be the only method to correct the
damage of a particularly stubborn and defiant custodial parent."386
FAMILY LAW-POST MINORITY CHILD SUPPORT
DONARSKI V. DONARSKI
In Donarski v. Donarski387 the court analyzed an award of post-
minority medical and college expenses for the child of a divorced
parent. 388 Concluding that the trial court's findings were inadequate, the
court reversed and remanded the case for further consideration. 389
Kenneth and Janet Donarski married in 1974.390 Kenneth subse-
quently adopted Amy, Janet's daughter from a previous marriage. 39 1
Kenneth and Janet also had two children of their own, Nathan and
BethAnn.392 During the marriage, Janet worked various part-time jobs
and served as the primary homemaker and caregiver for the children. 393
In 1996, Janet filed for divorce and, after a hearing, the trial court
granted her request. 394 The trial court's order provided that Kenneth
must pay for BethAnn's health insurance and medical expenses
"through the age of 23 or through her successful completion of college
and a bachelor's degree, whichever is sooner." 395 In addition, the trial
court ordered Kenneth to pay "one-half of BethAnn's reasonable
college education expenses, including books, tuition and housing." 396
The trial court defined "reasonable expenses" as those "incurred in
385. Id. 1 13, 590 N.W.2d at 223-24.
386. Id., 590 N.W.2d at 224.
387. 1998 N.D. 128, 581 N.W.2d 130.
388. Donarski v. Donarski, 1998 N.D. 128, 581 N.W.2d 130.
389. Id. 1 1, 581 N.W.2d at 132-33. The court also affirmed various other portions of the trial
court's order, such as an award of permanent spousal maintenance, a provision making Kenneth's
support obligations subject to an income withholding order, a provision securing Kenneth's support
obligations with life insurance, an award of limited health insurance, a provision requiring Kenneth to
pay BethAnn's uncovered medical expenses, and an award of attorney's fees. Id. in 11-17, 581
N.W.2d at 134-35. The court spent the majority of its energy dealing with the post-minority support
award, and, accordingly, this article will focus only on that issue.
390. Id. 2, 581 N.W.2d at 133.
391. Id.
392. Id. At the time of the opinion, Nathan was 21 years old, and BethAnn was 16 years old. Id.
393. Id. 3.
394. Id. 4.
395. Id. 18, 581 N.W.2d at 135.
396. Id.
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pursuing a four year degree in consecutive years upon graduation from
high school." 397 Kenneth appealed, asserting that the trial court clearly
erred in ordering him to pay support for an adult child. 398
On review, the court first noted that "[i]n a divorce action, the court
has authority to order payment of post-minority support, including
college expenses, under appropriate circumstances." 399 The court
acknowledged a trend toward awarding support for children's college
education because of an increased necessity for a college education and
because of the increased costs of acquiring such education. 400
While cautioning that a trial court's authority to award post-
minority support for a child is limited, the court identified several factors
which should be considered when determining if post-minority support
is appropriate. 401 Such factors included whether the parent would have
contributed toward the costs of the higher education, the reasonableness
of the child's expectation for higher education, the amount of money
sought for the higher education, the ability of the parent to pay that
amount, the relationship of the requested amount to the type of school
or course of study sought, the financial resources of both parents, the
commitment and aptitude of the child, the financial resources of the
child, and the availability of financial aid.402 Of the factors, the court
stressed the parent's ability to pay was most important, since a "parent
cannot be compelled to contribute to an adult child's college expenses if
the parent's financial resources are lacking." 403
Turning to the specific facts of the case, the court noted the trial
court's limited findings, which it described as merely conclusory state-
ments. 404 For example, the trial court had found that Kenneth "helped
the older children, Amy and Nathan by providing funds toward a college
education" and that "Kenneth has the ability to provide for and pay a
portion of BethAnn's college expenses." 405  The court accordingly
determined that the trial court had not made specific findings of the rele-
vant factors and circumstances necessary for a post-minority award of
child support. 406
397. Id.
398. Id., 581 N.W.2d at 135-36.
399. Id. 1 19, 581 N.W.2d at 136 (citing Zarrett v. Zarrett, 1998 N.D. 49, 114, 574 N.W.2d 855,
858-59).
400. Id. (citing Davis v. Davis, 268 N.W.2d 769, 778 (N.D. 1978), overruled on other grounds by
Nelson v. Trinity Medical Center, 419 N.W.2d 886 (N.D. 1988)).
401. Id. 20.
402. Id. (citing Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1038-39 (N.J. 1982)).
403. Id. 21 (citing Mochring v. Maute, 633 A.2d 1055, 1056-57 (N.J. 1993)).
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In addition, the court pointed out that the trial court had not placed
a limit on the amount of Kenneth's obligation and had not described the
quality or cost of the education to be financed by Kenneth. 407 While ack-
nowledging that setting an exact dollar amount for such an award would
not always be desirable or feasible, the court stressed that "fairness and
equity require that obligors not be subjected to court-ordered obliga-
tions that are unlimited." 408 Consequently, the court concluded that the
trial court's award of post-minority support was not adequately support-
ed by specific factual findings and was not sufficiently described by
reasonable limitations.4 09 The court thus reversed the award of post-




In Weber v. Weber,411 the supreme court examined the doctrine of
unconscionability in the context of a property settlement agreement. 4 12
The court affirmed the trial court judgment setting aside the agreement
in its entirety. 4 13
Ruby Moos, formerly Ruby Weber, married Herbert Weber on
September 13, 1995.414 Twenty-seven days later, she hired an attorney
to begin a divorce action. 415 Herbert, who at the time was not represent-
ed by counsel, signed a settlement agreement giving Ruby ownership of
a condominium Herbert owned before the marriage. 416 Four days later,
the settlement agreement was filed in the district court.4 17 That same




410. Id. 26. Chief Justice VandeWalle and Justice Sandstrom each wrote separate opinions.
Chief Justice VandeWalle disagreed with the majority, asserting that post-minority support was not
appropriate here and thus reconsideration of that issue was improper. Id. 1 28. While not totally
foreclosing the trial court's authority to order post-minority support for higher education, Chief Justice
VandeWalle contended that the statutory law and case law did not support such an order here. Id.
28, 33, 581 N.W.2d at 137-38. Justice Sandstrom also asserted that post-minority support for college
education was not appropriate. Id. 37, 581 N.W.2d at 138. He stressed that section 14-09-08.2(4) of
the North Dakota Century Code did not grant authority to the trial courts to award post-minority
support. Id. 41, 581 N.W.2d at 139. Rather, he argued that it merely did not preclude other statutory
circumstances where parents are responsible for the support of adult children. Id. 42.
411. 1999 N.D. 11,589 N.W.2d 358.




416. Id. "The property settlement agreement was accompanied by a quitclaim deed . I..." Id
417. Id. 13.
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the agreement. 41 8 The district court denied this and later motions, find-
ing Herbert able to act freely in his own interest and also finding no
mistake, fraud, or undue duress.4 19
On the first appeal, 420 the supreme court determined that the district
court erred by not considering whether the property settlement agree-
ment was unconscionable.4 21 On remand, the district court examined
three issues in determining the unconscionability of the settlement agree-
ment: 1) the one-sidedness of the agreement; 2) the creation of hardship
for either party; and 3) considering the Ruff-Fischer guidelines,422 the
fairness, justice, and propriety of the agreement. 423 Applying these
criteria, the district court found the agreement unconscionable, and set it
aside in its entirety.4 24
The supreme court noted that "district courts should make two find-
ings when considering whether a settlement agreement between divorc-
ing parties should be enforced." 425 The first is whether the agreement is
free from mistake, duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and the
second is whether the agreement is unconscionable.4 26 The first of these
was determined in the first district court action, and since it was not
reversed on appeal, the court deemed it met. 427
The second determination, whether the agreement was unconsciona-
ble, began with the district court finding the agreement one-sided. 428
The supreme court agreed, stating, "This appears to be the kind of
agreement no rational, undeluded person would make, and no honest
and fair person would accept." 429 The second finding, of greater hard-
ship, was clearly on Herbert, who lost his residence in the agreement. 430
The application of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines also led to the finding that
418. Id.
419. Id. 4.
420. Weber v. Weber, 548 N.W.2d 781 (N.D. 1996).
421. Weber, 5, 589 N.W.2d at 359-60.
422. See id. 17 n.2, 589 N.W.2d at 362 n.2.
Considered under the Ruff-Fischer guidelines are: 'the respective ages of the parties,
their earning ability, the duration of the marriage and conduct of the parties during the
marriage, their station in life, the circumstances and necessities of each, their health and
physical condition, their financial circumstances as shown by the property owned at the
time, its value at the time, its income-producing capacity, if any, whether accumulated
before or after the marriage, and such other matters as may be material.'
Id. (quoting Van Klootwyk v. Van Klootwyk, 1997 N.D. 88, 14, 563 N.W.2d 377, 380).
423. Id. 6, 589 N.W.2d at 360.
424. Id.
425. Id. 12, 589 N.W.2d at 361.
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the agreement was unjust and unfair to Herbert. 431 The supreme court
noted that while the Ruff-Fischer guidelines are not the standard for
determining unconscionability in a domestic relations settlement agree-
ment, it is appropriate to consider them in this determination, as domestic
relations agreements should not be examined in the same way as a
business contract. 432
FAMILY LAW-TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
IN THE INTEREST OF A.S.
In the Interest of A.S.433 involved an appeal of a juvenile court's
ruling to terminate parental rights. Reasoning that there was clear and
convincing evidence supporting the termination of the mother's parental
rights, the court upheld the juvenile court's ruling.434
In December 1994, the mother-appellant, R.S., and the father, D.S.,
had a child, A.S.435 After they separated, R.S. had physical custody of
A.S.436 In January 1996, A.S. was removed from R.S.'s home after a
person was found dead there. 437 R.S. admitted to having a party and to
taking heroin, but she claimed she was forced to take the drug.438 A.S.
was then placed in foster care. 439 After missing two appointments for a
chemical dependency evaluation, R.S. stipulated to the placement of A.S.
in the custody of the county's social services. 440 R.S. also agreed to
complete chemical dependency and psychological evaluations. 44 1 In
May 1996, R.S., intending to "get her life in order," left the state with a
boyfriend.442 In December 1996, she returned to the state.443 However,
she did not visit A.S. until February 1997.444 At that time, R.S. agreed to
extend the control of the county's social services for another year. 445 In
addition, R.S. was told that if she did not make significant progress in the
431. Id. 1 17, 589 N.W.2d at 361-62.
432. Id.
433. 1998 N.D. 181, 584 N.W.2d 853.
434. In the Interest of A.S., 1998 N.D. 181, 1,584 N.W.2d 853, 854.
435. Id. 12.
436. Id. 3. D.S. did not contest the termination of his parental rights. Id. 2.
437. Id. 3. In addition, "A.S. was present during the party." Id., 584 N.W.2d at 855.
438. Id. 3, 584 N.W.2d at 854. R.S. then agreed to a 30-day removal. Id., 854 N.W.2d at 855.
439. Id. 14.
440. Id.
441. Id. In addition, R.S. agreed to follow through with recommendations from the evaluations.
Id.
442. Id. During the four months before she left the state, R.S. had visited A.S. only seven times
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next half year, a petition for termination of parental rights would be
filed.
4 46
After R.S. failed to complete her recommended chemical depen-
dency treatment and to obtain a psychological evaluation, the county
juvenile supervisor notified R.S that a petition seeking termination of her
parental rights would be sought. 447 At the December 1997 termination
hearing, a social worker, a juvenile supervisor, and the guardian ad litem
testified that termination was in A.S.'s best interests. 448 The judicial
referee determined, based on clear and convincing evidence, that A.S.
was a deprived child, that the deprivations would likely continue, and that
A.S. suffered harm because of the deprivations.4 49 The juvenile court
confirmed the referee's recommendation to terminate R.S.'s parental
rights, and R.S. appealed. 450
Upon "de novo-like" review, the court first pointed out that North
Dakota's Uniform Juvenile Court Act provided a three-part test for
termination of parental rights. 451 Under the test, the State had to prove
the following three components by clear and convincing evidence: 1)
the child is deprived, 2) the conditions and cause of the deprivation are
likely to continue, and 3) the child is suffering or will likely suffer,
serious physical mental, moral, or emotional harm. 452
The court then applied the test. Since R.S. did not contest that A.S.
was a deprived child, the court quickly disposed of the first part.4 5 3
Turning to the second prong, the court noted R.S.' lack of contact with
A.S. 4 54 The court specifically pointed out that R.S. had spent only
eleven hours with A.S. during the two years preceding the referee's
decision. 455 The court reasoned, however, that R.S.' past conduct alone
was not sufficient to warrant a finding that the deprivation would con-
446. Id.
447. Id. 1 7. R.S. testified that she did not receive the notification. Id. However, the notifying
letter was sent by certified mail, and the juvenile supervisor testified that R.S. received the letter. Id.
448. Id. 9[9.
449. Id.I 10.
450. Id., 854 N.W.2d at 855-56.
451. Id. If[ 13-15, 854 N.W.2d at 856 (citing N.D. CENr. CODE § 27-20-44(l)(b) (providing the
three-part test); In the Interest of L.F., 1998 N.D. 129, 12, 580 N.W.2d 573, 577 (providing that
review of a juvenile court's decision to terminate parent rights involves a "manner similar to a trial de
novo")).
452. Id. 15 (citing In the Interest of L.F., 1 0, 580 N.W.2d at 576-77).
453. Id. 1 16. The court explained that a deprived child was one who "is without proper parental
care or control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for the
child's physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals, and the deprivation is not due primarily to the
lack of financial means of the child's parents." Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(5)(a)).
454. Id. 20, 854 N.W.2d at 857. The court also noted that R.S. herself was likely raised in an
abusive environment. Id. In addition, the court observed that R.S had no role models from whom she
could learn to be a good parent. Id.
455. Id. The court noted that that period "encompassed approximately two-thirds of A.S.'s life."
Id.
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tinue. 456 The court thus considered prognostic evidence. Specifically,
the court stressed that the juvenile supervisor, the foster care worker, and
the guardian ad litem predicted that the deprivation would continue.45 7
In addition, a child psychiatrist testified that custody of A.S. could be
returned to R.S. in one or two years at the earliest and that it would take
some time for R.S. to acquire the necessary parent skills.4 58 The court
consequently concluded that prong two had been satisfied.459
The court then considered the third prong. As it noted earlier, the
court stressed that A.S. has had little or no contact with R.S. for almost
two years.460 The court further recognized that R.S. had admitted that it
would take her at least a year before she would be ready to care for
A.S.461 Accordingly, the court reasoned that harmful conditions current-
ly existed and that they could lead to even more future harm because
A.S. would likely continue to grow more attached to the foster
parents. 462 The court thus found that the third prong had been met.
Concluding that the three-part test had been met and that upon
"balanc[ing] the hardship A.S. had already suffered with the lack of a
sure future with R.S.," the court held that termination of R.S.' parental
rights was appropriate. 463
456. Id.
457. Id. 1 24. Although R.S. argued that she had changed, only minimal evidence supported a
finding that the deprivation would not continue. Id. 26. For instance, the child psychiatrist noted that
with continued work, R.S. has the potential to care for a child, and an addiction counselor testified that
R.S. had done well in treatment. Id. if 22, 26.
458. Id. 122.
459. Id. 30, 854 N.W.2d at 858 (finding that the State had shown by clear and convincing
evidence that the conditions of A.S.'s deprivation would likely continue).
460. Id. 132.
461. Id.
462. Id. The court noted that it would take a long time for R.S. and A.S. to form the bond a
parent and child should have. Id. 33, 854 N.W.2d at 859. The court also reasoned that A.S. had
developed bonds with the foster parents that were likely to grow even stronger and would "cause her
unnecessary pain if the foster care relationship [wals lengthened, then ended." Id. Further, the court
rejected R.S.' proposition that A.S. should remain in foster care in lieu of terminating her parental
rights since "assisting a parent to establish an adequate environment for the children by offering
long-term and intensive treatment is not mandated if it cannot be successfully undertaken in a time
frame that would enable the child to return to the parental home without causing severe dislocation
from emotional attachments formed during long-term foster care." Id. (citing In the Interest of
C.K.H., 458 N.W.2d 303, 307 (N.D. 1990)).
463. Id. (134.
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TORTS-LIABILITY OF PASSENGERS IN VEHICLE DRIVEN BY AN INTOXICATED
PERSON
HURT V. FREELAND
In Hurt,464 the court analyzed a claim involving passenger negli-
gence. 465 Reasoning that there was no special relationship between a
passenger and the intoxicated driver of a vehicle, the court concluded
that no basis for passenger liability existed and affirmed summary
judgment in favor of the defendant-passenger.
4 66
On Christmas Eve 1993, Cory Meyer, Traci and Tim Olson, and
Tyler Freeland had been drinking alcohol.4 67 During the evening, the
Olsons, being too intoxicated to drive, asked Meyer for a ride to Oakes,
North Dakota. 468 Although Oakes was farther than his destination,
Meyer agreed to give them a ride. 469 On the way to Oakes, Meyer's
pickup hit an ice patch and crossed into the opposite lane. 470 Intending
to avoid an oncoming car, Tim Olson then told Meyer how to move the
pickup back into the right lane but the pickup collided with an oncom-
ing car, killing three of its passengers and injuring two others.471
Subsequently, the injured passengers and the representatives of the
deceased passengers sued the Olsons and Freeland, alleging passenger
negligence.4 72 The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants and the plaintiffs appealed. 473
On appeal, the court first analyzed whether the passengers owed a
duty of care to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs' decedent. 474 The court
noted that generally passengers do not owe a duty to injured parties. 475
464. 1999 N.D. 12, 589 N.W.2d 551.
465. Hurt v. Freeland, 1999 N.D. 12, 1, 589 N.W.2d 551, 553. The court also was presented




469. Id., 589 N.W.2d at 553-54. Meyer's destination was his parents' farm south of Oakes. Id.
470. Id., 589 N.w.2d at 554. Meyer's pickup crossed from the northbound lane into the south-
bound lane. Id.
471. Id. It 2-3, 589 N.W.2d at 553-54. In addition, just prior to impact, Tim Olson said "brace
yourselves." Id. 3, 589 N.W.2d at 554.
472. Id. 4. In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs also alleged other grounds for their suit,
including civil conspiracy, state RICO, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and prima facie tort.
Id.
473. Id. 5. The procedural history of the suit also included a previous appeal not important to
the instant review. Id. 4. In addition, the plaintiffs reached a settlement with Meyer. Id. 1 4 n. 1.
474. Id. 1 11, 589 N.W.2d at 555. The court also noted that "[allthough negligence actions are
ordinarily not appropriate for summary judgment, whether a duty exists is generally a preliminary
question of law for the court to decide." Id. 9 (citing Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521
N.W.2d 401,406 (N.D. 1994); Delair v. County of LaMoure, 326 N.W.2d 55, 58 (N.D. 1982)).
475. Id. 1 13 (citing Brian Shipp, Note, Price v. Halstead: Liability of a Guest Passenger for the
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Further, the court determined that there was no statutory duty under
North Dakota's dram shop law since no evidence suggested that the
passengers provided alcohol to Meyer.476
The court then examined whether North Dakota's comparative fault
statute could be a basis for passenger liability. 477 The court pointed out
that the statute "addresses three different types of conduct by tort-
feasors: those who 'act in concert in committing a tortious act,' those
who 'aid or encourage' a tortious act, or those who 'ratify or adopt' the
tortious act." 478 However, citing recent case law, the court quickly dis-
posed of the contention that the comparative fault statue created an inde-
pendent basis of liability.4 79 Rather, the court concluded that the statute
merely "deals with the allocation of damages among those already at
fault." 480
Turning to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court considered
whether a basis for liability existed there.4 81 The court noted that under
the Restatement, a person may be liable for liable for the harm to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another if he commits a tortious act
in concert with the other or if he knows that the other's conduct is a
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the
other. 482 Applying the Restatement, the court found nothing to indicate
that the passengers aided or encouraged Meyer.4 83 In support, the court
stressed that the passengers neither provided alcohol to Meyer nor
encouraged him to consume alcohol. 484 Further, the court noted that the
evidence did not show that the passengers even knew Meyer was
intoxicated. 485 Consequently, the court found no basis for liability
under the Restatement. 486
The court next reviewed the issue of passenger liability based on
interference with the driver. 487 The court explained that where a passen-
ger substantially interferes with the operation of a vehicle, the passenger
may be liable for resulting harm because the passenger has a duty not to
interfere. 488 The court then considered the plaintiffs' two specific argu-
ments. First, the plaintiffs argued that Tim Olson substantially interfered
Negligence of his Drunk Driver, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 159, 162 (1989))
476. Id. 14-17, 589 N.W.2d at 555-56 (discussing N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06.1).
477. Id. 18, 589 N.W.2d at 556 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02).
478. Id. 20, 589 N.W.2d at 557.
479. Id. 21 (citing Target Stores v. Automated Maintenance Services, Inc., 492 N.W.2d 899,
902 (N.D. 1992); Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219, 224 (N.D. 1989)).
480. Id.
481. Id. 122.
482. Id. (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a)-(b) (1977)).
483. Id. 25, 589 N.W.2d at 558.
484. Id. "Simply stated, the Olsons needed a ride, and Meyer provided one." Id.
485. Id. 28.
486. Id.
487. Id. 29, 589 N.W.2d at 558-59.
488. Id. (citing Lind v. Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)).
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with the operation of the vehicle by telling Meyer how to get back into
the proper lane after the pickup hit the ice patch.4 89 Characterizing Tim
Olson's remarks as mere suggestions on how to avoid the collision, the
court rejected the argument.4 90 The court also pointed out that no evi-
dence indicated that Meyer actually accepted and acted on the sugges-
tion or that the suggestion contributed to the accident.491
Second, the plaintiffs argued that the Olsons substantially interfered
with the operation of the vehicle by requesting a ride from Meyer to a
place beyond Meyer's destination.4 92 Acknowledging that other juris-
dictions had held a passenger's request to an intoxicated person for a
ride to a certain destination to be insufficient to create passenger liability,
the court quickly disposed of the argument. 493
Summarizing, the court noted that the responsibility belonged to
Meyer, not the passengers. 494 Further, the court held that "in the ab-
sence of some special relationship imposing a duty or causing the
negligence of the driver to be imputed to the passenger, there is no duty
upon a guest passenger to a person outside the vehicle to exercise any
control or give any warning to the driver of the vehicle." 495 The court
accordingly affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to
the passengers. 496
TORTS-PRODUCTS LIABILITY-ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE
CLARYS V. FORD MOTOR COMPANY
In Clarys v. Ford Motor Company,4 97 the North Dakota Supreme
Court considered for the first time whether the economic loss doctrine,
which bars action in tort when the only damage alleged is to the product




490. Id., 589 N.W.2d at 559.
491. Id.
492. Id. 30 (citing Fugate v. Galvin, 406 N.E.2d 19, 21 (111. Ct. App. 1980)).
493. Id. 30-32. (citing Fugate, 406 N.E.2d at 20, 22).
494. Id. 133.
495. Id.
496. Id. 39, 589 N.W.2d at 560. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim based on a
conspiracy to testify falsely. Id. 1 34, 589 N.W.2d at 559. The court reasoned that although some
inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses may have existed, there was no evidence of damages
caused by the alleged conspiracy. Id. 38, 589 N.W.2d at 560.
497. 1999 N.D. 72, 592 N.W.2d 573.
498. Clarys v. Ford Motor Company, 1999 N.D. 72, 8, 592 N.W.2d 573, 575.
499. Id. 20, 592 N.W.2d at 579.
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Joseph Clarys bought a used Ford Aerostar van in 1995.500 The
next year, the van caught fire and burned while unattended in a parking
lot.501 Clarys's insurer paid him for his loss, then sued Ford in Clarys's
name in a subrogation action, claiming negligence, product liability, and
breach of warranty. 502 Ford moved for summary judgment, which the
trial court granted for the warranty claim, concluding that the statute of
limitations had run.503 The trial court, however, denied Ford's motion to
dismiss the tort claims, reasoning that the economic loss doctrine does
not apply to consumers. 504
The supreme court, approaching this question for the first time,
noted "[t]he majority of courts which have adopted the economic loss
doctrine have applied it to both consumers and business purchasers."505
Concentrating on the "separate and distinct functions served by tort and
contract law," 506 the court explained that contract remedies are more
appropriate for purchasers of defective goods.507 The court described
the economic loss doctrine as "the fundamental boundary between
contract law, which is designed to enforce the expectancy interests of the
parties, and tort law, which imposes a duty of reasonable care and there-
by encourages citizens to avoid causing physical harm to others." 508
The court also noted that Section 21 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
which is consistent with North Dakota's product liability law, does not
allow for recovery of damages to a defective product itself.509
The court concluded that the economic loss doctrine applies to
consumer purchasers as well as business purchasers.510 In accordance
with this holding, the court reversed the judgment against Ford, and
remanded for entry of judgment dismissing Clarys's tort claims. 51"
500. Id. 1 2, 592 N.W.2d at 573. At the time Clarys bought the van, it had 95,182 miles on it. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id., 592 N.W.2d at 573-74.
503. Id. 3, 592 N.W.2d at 574.
504. Id.
505. Id. 9, 592 N.W.2d at 575.
506. Id. 10.
507. Id. - 10-11, 592 N.W.2d at 575-76.
508. Id. 1 12, 592 N.W.2d at 576 (quoting Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley
Toppino and Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1246 (Fla. 1993)).
509. Id. 18, 592 N.W.2d at 578.
510. Id. 20, 592 N.W.2d at 579.
511. Id.
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